An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to \u27Snitch\u27 by Brown, Eleanor Marie
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to 'Snitch' 
Eleanor Marie Brown 
George Washington University Law School, eub226@psu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eleanor M. Brown, An Addendum to Cox and Posner: A Visa to "Snitch," 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 973 (2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832747
ESSAY 
AN ADDENDUM TO COX AND POSNER: A VISA TO “SNITCH”  
 
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Information 
2000 H Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20052 
(786) 201 3823 
embrown@law.gwu.edu 
 
 
 
 
About the author 
 
 
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law; 
Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation; Former Chairman of the Jamaica Trade 
Board; Former Reginald Lewis Fellow, Harvard Law School; Former Law Clerk to 
the Honorable Patricia Wald (ret.), U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Keith Ellison, U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas; J.D., Yale (1999); M.Phil.  Politics, Oxford 
(1997) (Rhodes Scholar).  I have benefited from both informal and formal feedback 
at the New America Foundation, the Immigration Law Teachers Conference, the 
George Washington University, the American Society of International Law, the 
Harvard Business School, the Harvard Law School, the Harvard Department of 
Sociology, the BIARI Institute (Brown University), and the LatCrit Conference. 
 
Draft: Please do not cite without the permission of the author. 
 
 
1 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832747
 
Abstract 
 
Cox and Posner’s landmark contribution is the first article to have 
highlighted the challenges of information asymmetry in immigration 
screening. While Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant 
contribution, there is a critical oversight in their framework: they do 
not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of 
screening educational elites.  This Essay is an attempt to remedy Cox 
and Posner’s omission. Why is this oversight so problematic? In the 
post-9/11 world, U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the 
horns of a dilemma. While immigrant educational elites are critical to 
U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their 
recruiting among well-trained elites.  
 
In visa application processes, screening out terrorism suspects is 
notoriously complicated, in part because terrorist networks are 
typically difficult for outsiders to penetrate.  Yet, the same cannot be 
said of elite networks.  Indeed, the term “global elite” is meant to 
reflect precisely the fact that a network of rich, well-educated persons 
from developing countries exists, and that members of this network 
are now bona fide members of the Western elite.  Social network 
theory tells us that these elites are typically only a few degrees of 
separation apart.  Yet while a primary goal of immigration law is 
screening, the U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of 
screening elite aliens utilizing what this Essay terms “insufficiently 
networked” information.  This screening typically occurs with little 
reference to the closely-knit elite networks whence these aliens 
originate, even as these networks are far better placed to access 
information about their members.  A primary goal of immigration law 
should be to leverage these networks to supply the government with 
early warning signals when U.S. visa recipients display terrorist 
sympathies.   
 
This Essay seeks to mitigate the challenges of information gathering 
about such elites through an under-utilized and under-theorized 
sanction, namely, visa-revocation.  If not as a de jure matter, certainly 
as a de facto matter, elites typically have access to U.S. immigration 
privileges that are not easily available to their fellow nationals.  Visas 
are status-conveyers, and their loss may undermine business and 
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educational opportunities dear to global elites.  In a proposal referred 
to in shorthand as “a visa to snitch,” I impose a “duty to snitch” on 
elite visa-recipients.  Each time that a visa holder commits a terrorist 
act, the authorities would determine which persons in her network 
knew of her terrorist sympathies and failed to report them.  These 
persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a reduced 
prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate that 
they had good reason not to know or not to report. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The legal scholarship has much to say about questions of immigrant 
“type,” namely, which immigrants, among the millions who seek 
entry, should be admitted to the U.S. and in what numbers. Yet, while 
much has been written about these “first-order” questions,1 the law 
review literature has little to say about how the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”)2 can ensure that the persons selected 
actually match its “type” preferences. The scholarship has been 
neglectful of “second-order” questions of institutional design.3 
 
A refreshing exception to this general scholarly inattention is Cox and 
Posner (2007).4 They argue that the principal institutional design 
choice for any state is between ex ante screening, in which an alien is 
screened on the basis of pre-entry information and denied entry if she 
does not fit the state’s first-order goals and an ex post system, in which 
an alien is screened on the basis of post-entry information and 
deported if she does not meet first-order policy.5 Cox and Posner’s 
analysis is enormously important: it provides a compelling explanatory 
framework for many puzzles in immigration law and policy, including 
the astronomical increase in federal immigration prosecutions.6 They 
argue that this prosecutorial trend reflects an increasing institutional 
bias for ex post as opposed to ex ante screening.7  
 
                                                           
1  The phrase “first-order” is Cox and Posner’s. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. 
Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 
(2007).  For a response, see Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, 
Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857 (2007).  
2  In the aftermath of September 11, the Federal government was re-organized 
to create the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). DHS now houses 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which bears primary responsibility 
for the federal immigration enforcement function.  For a discussion of how DHS was 
organized to accommodate ICE, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M. 
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, Ch. 1 (2009). 
3  This scholarly neglect is also briefly discussed in a previous contribution by 
the author. Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2475 (2009). 
4      See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. 
5  Id. 
6      See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text  
7  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. 
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Why this ex post bias? A primary reason offered by Cox and Posner is 
information asymmetry.8 Even as Congress dictates particular type-
preferences, the government is generally not well placed to collect and 
screen information about potential migrants. For example, a potential 
migrant will generally know much more about herself, and whether 
she will abide by U.S. immigration laws, than a consular visa-officer.9 
Post-entry screening mitigates the challenges of information 
asymmetry since the U.S. is better able to access and screen 
information about aliens once they are already in the country.10 Herein 
lies the primary explanation for the post-entry bias: given minimal 
access to reliable pre-entry information, DHS expends significant 
resources “double-checking” that only the right “types” have been 
admitted to the U.S. and ferreting out and deporting the “wrong” 
types, particularly among low-skilled aliens who are often unable to 
provide reliable pre entry documentation. 11   
 
Post 9/11, there is evidence that the U.S. has also invested significant 
resources in ferreting out and deporting the “wrong types” even among 
members of the global elite,12 namely, the group of persons who 
                                                           
8    For a general summary of the challenges of information asymmetry, 
particularly in the context of contracting, see Introduction to PATRICK BOLTON & 
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005).  For a broader discussion of ex 
ante versus ex post approaches to regulation, partly because of information 
asymmetry, see, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT Law 
277-80 (1987).  Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening 
immigrants (that is, persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly 
citizenship).  For broader reflections on the applications of economic principles to 
immigration law including the admission of short-term guests, see generally, 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Immigration Policy, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Michael J. Trebilcock, 
The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 271 
(2003); Michael J. Trebilcock and Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of 
Emigration and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 234 (2006). 
9  Consular officers are State Department employees stationed in Embassies 
overseas. They are typically the “on the ground” screeners of visa applications. For a 
general discussion of their role see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, Chapter 
1 (2009).   
10  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813. 
11  Id. 
12  The new emphasis on federal screening of elites is discussed in Philip 
Shandon, In the Wake of the Times Square Bomb Case, the Feds Just Issued a 
Chilling Warning to Pakistani Leaders: Check Your Family and Staff for Terrorist 
Ties, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2010, 9:47 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-21/faisal-shahzad-case-
6 
 
occupy the apex of their social order, attend the same coterie of 
Western universities, and work and reside within one degree of 
separation of their fellow elites in their countries of origin.13 DHS 
appears to have been particularly focused on post-entry screening of 
elites with scientific credentials such as engineers.14  The information 
asymmetry rationale has less explanatory power with respect to elite 
migrants, since issues of information collection and verification are 
less acute. 15 In contrast to their-low skilled counterparts, elites are 
well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they will be productive 
and well-behaved (such as professional certifications). Moreover, 
given modern advances in information technology, these proxies may 
be easily verified even halfway across the globe.   
 
Even as they are generally agnostic on U.S. institutional design 
choices, Cox and Posner emphasize the reduced explanatory power of 
the information asymmetry rationale in this context and appear 
troubled by the disproportionate focus on post-entry screening among 
                                                                                                                                            
spurs-feds-to-warn-pakistans-leaders-check-your-families-for-terrorism-ties/.  See 
also infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
13 See generally P. BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE 
FIELD OF POWER (1996) (for a classic sociological utilization of the term “elite.”)  
See also JANINE WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE (2009) for a contemporary utilization of the 
term, which is generally used to refer to a small group of people who control a 
disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege, and access to decision-making.  A 
recent issue of The Economist also discusses the extraordinary influence of these 
elites, with a particular focus on elites in the developing world. See The Rich and 
The Rest: A Special Report on the Global Elite. THE ECONOMIST, 58, Jan. 22, 2011.  
In social science circles, the term “elite” has long associated with Marx scholars. See 
generally, T.B. BOTTOMORE, ELITES AND SOCIETY (1964). However, the term has 
long had broader currency shorn of Marxist connotations, and there have been 
several landmark studies of economic, political, academic and cultural elites, 
primarily in the “West” but also more broadly.  See generally, C. WRIGHT MILLS, 
THE POWER ELITE (1956); FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A 
STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); M. SCHWARTZ, THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN 
AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ELITE AS RULING CLASS (1987); G. WILLIAM 
DORNHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967); ROBERT PUTNAM, A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES (1976) (all containing detailed anthropological, 
sociological or political science studies of how elites function).   
14  Cox and Posner use the term “highly skilled.” I will utilize this term 
interchangeably with “educational elites.” 
15  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 825. 
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educational elites.16 What is the source of their discomfort? For elites 
in particular, the economic stakes of institutional design choices 
appear to be high. Why so? There is a real risk that highly talented but 
risk-averse persons may be deterred from migrating to the U.S.  The 
economic data is unambiguous: the U.S. economy needs educational 
elites.17 Microsoft Founder Bill Gates has famously pointed out that 
Google, Oracle, and Intel were all founded by immigrant computer 
scientists.18 Notably, the Blackberry smart phone was also invented by 
immigrants – in Canada rather than the United States.19  Gates 
contends that the U.S. is falling behind in the competitive race for 
global talent due partly to an anachronistic immigration system. Cox 
and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns and are disinclined to 
augment these challenges.20 Thus, in the context of the highly skilled, 
they seem to express a preference for ex ante screening.21 
 
Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant contribution; 
they are the only scholars to have weighed the comparative advantages 
of ex ante versus ex post approaches. Yet, there is a critical oversight 
in their framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex 
post mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this 
problematic? While elite immigrants are clearly critical for U.S. 
economic growth, terrorist networks have also stepped up their 
recruiting among such elites. Among the many aspirants to global 
notoriety as bombers, it is the elite and well-educated that are most 
                                                           
16 Id.  Motomura also seems to share a similar concern. See Motomura, supra 
note 1 at 869 (noting that "lessons in Second-Order Structure about ex post screening 
are less convincing for noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States, and 
especially unconvincing for permanent residents."). 
17  See infra text accompanying notes. 
18  Bill Gates testimony is summarized in Miriam Jordan, Skilled Worker Visa 
Applicants Expected to Soar, WALL ST. J. Mar., 31 2008 at A2.   Before the H. 
Comm. On Science and Technology (statement of William H. Gates, Chairman, 
Microsoft),  available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/congress.mspx 
19  The invention of the Blackberry smart phone in Canada is discussed in 
THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURY (2007). 
20  I should point out that Cox and Posner do not specifically mention Gates’ 
testimony. However, they clearly share a similar concern.  See Cox & Posner, supra 
note 1, at 813. 
21  Id. 
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likely to be chosen by Al Qaeda’s leadership.22 Indeed Al Qaeda’s 
own leadership has been populated by such elites.23  Among recent 
terror attempts, the most highly publicized was that of the Pakistani 
would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who was previously 
a recipient of elite student and professional visas and was undoubtedly 
a member of the global elite.24  Profiles of famous terrorism suspects 
reveal this theme repeating itself.25  Moreover there is another critical 
omission in Cox and Posner’s analysis: ex ante screening is 
complicated because elites have resources which allow them to 
obscure “red flags.” Additionally, some persons undergo extreme 
radicalization only after they receive their visas. For such subjects, ex 
ante screening would hardly suffice; ex post screening is critical. 
 
Indeed, this was one of the justifications offered for the FBI’s large-
scale questioning of students and scientists of Middle Eastern origin 
after 9/11.  Although the FBI’s dragnet has generally withstood 
judicial review,26 such action is arguably ineffective. There needs to 
                                                           
22 Richard Bernstein, Letter from America, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31iht-letter.html.   
23  Id.  Several members of Al Qaeda’s current leadership originate from such 
backgrounds. Most famously, Osama Bin Laden is the son of a monied and 
influential Saudi contractor. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri is a doctor from an 
affluent and prominent Egyptian family, with several distinguished academics. 
24  At the time of the attack, Shahzad was a naturalized American citizen.  
However, prior to naturalization he had been the recipient of several visas, including 
an F1 student visa to study at an American university and a highly selective H1B 
visa for skilled foreign nationals.  Faisal Shahzad, Times Topics, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/faisal_shahzad/index.ht
ml?scp=1&sq=Shahzad%20&st=cse (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  While Shahzad had 
recently fallen on hard times, by virtue of his advantages of birth and Western 
education, he was undoubtedly a member of the global elite. 
25 Bernstein, supra note 22; Andrew Sullivan makes a similar point in his 
Atlantic Monthly blog.  See Andrew Sullivan, A Very Bourgeois Would-Be Bomber, 
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY: THE DAILY DISH, (Dec. 29, 2009, 10:53 AM), 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/12/a-very-bourgeois-
wouldbe-bomber.html. 
26 A summary of the outcome of legal challenges to the FBI’s post 9/11 dragnet of 
student visa-recipients of Middle Eastern origin and Muslims more generally, is 
included in MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, 
AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL 
UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, AT 7-14 (2003). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW (2003); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (2003). 
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be a narrow and targeted mechanism of double-checking that elite 
aliens meet U.S. type preferences.  This Essay offers one such 
mechanism.  Congress should leverage highly desirable visas to elicit 
valuable information about potential terrorists.  To accomplish this 
goal, it should impose an explicit requirement on certain U.S. visa 
holders to inform on family and friends who may harbor fanatically 
dangerous hatred of America – or risk losing their highly coveted 
access to the U.S. I will refer to this proposal in shorthand as “a visa to 
itch.” 
behavior of the father of the “Underwear Bomber,”  Umar Farouk 
sn
  
Notably, several of Shahzad’s family and friends, including his father 
– a retired high ranking Pakistani military officer - noticed his extreme 
radicalism.27 And yet no one among Pakistani elites – presumably 
with U.S. visas and ready access to both Pakistani and U.S. law 
enforcement – appears to have snitched.28 Consider the contrasting 
29
                                                           
27  The question of what precisely constitutes Islamic fundamentalism is a 
controversial one.  In “Western” public political discourse, the phrase has come to
used interchangeably with Islamicism and generally refers to the group of religious
ideologies advocating a return to the “fundamentals” of Islam as embodied in the 
Quran (the holy book) and the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet Muhammed).  
See generally, GRAHAM FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (2003); OLIVIER 
ROY, FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (1994).  Central tenets include the obligation of
Muslims to obey 
 be 
 
 
oval of 
 
Muslim community. See generally, FRED 
LIDA
 well-known among Pakistani elites 
arbo
arged 
.uk/w 09/de
EE PRESS, Dec. 16, 2009, 
sharia (Islamic law); pan-Islamic political unity; and the rem
non-Muslim (particularly Western) political, cultural and military influences from 
the Muslim world. Yet others indicate that Islamicism has been erroneously 
conflated with fundamentalism. They argue that it consists of a continuum of more 
fluid ideologies that emphasize Muslim identity, authenticity, the unity of Muslim
peoples, and the general revitalization of 
HAL Y, ISLAM AND THE MYTH OF CONFRONTATION (1996); JOHN ESPOSITO, 
VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (1983).    
28  Since then there have been media reports that several other well-heeled 
Pakistanis – including some with U.S. visas - are
to h r terrorist sympathies. Yet, this information is not being shared with U.S. 
intelligence. See Philip Shandon, supra note 12. 
29 The bomb-making materials were concealed in Abdulmutallab’s underwear, 
which accounts for the would-be bomber’s popular name.  Anahad O'Connor and 
Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 26, 2009 at A1;  James Sturcke, Flight Terror Suspect Abdulmutallab Ch
With Trying to Blow Up Jet, GUARDIAN UK, Dec. 27, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co orld/20 c/27/us-terror-flight-abdulmutallab-
charged; Kathleen Gray and Christina Hall, Attempted Attack Raises Airport Security 
Concerns, DET. FR
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Abdul Mutallab (“Abdulmutallab”),30 a prosperous Nigerian 
engineering student and a repeated recipient of multi-entry, multi-year 
U.S. vistors’ visas.31  As a well-known banker and philanthropist, 
Father Mutallab was undoubtedly a member of the global elite and 
was also a recipient of a multi-year, multi-entry U.S. visitors’ visa. 
(henceforth “Umarmutallab”).32   He repeatedly alerted the American 
authorities to his son’s trips to Yemen, an atypical destination for a 
member of Nigeria’s jet-setting elite.33    This was a rare red flag.34  
Parents generally do not turn in their children.35   
 
Notably, Umarmutallab, was the only one to report his son36 – though 
as appears to be the case with Shahzad, a much broader circle noticed 
young Mutallab’s disturbing radicalism.37  In one sense, this is 
                                                                                                                                            
://ww
ultiple-yea
llab, 
k-Abdul-Mutallab.html.  (referring to trips to 
. 
, Jan. 16, 2010, 
ytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/africa/17abdulmutallab.html?pagewante
. 
  
nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10dowd.html.  
 prom
ifficulties inherent in the decision of 
 on a family member in Criminal Justice and the Challenge of 
http w.freep.com/print/article/20091226/NEWS05/91226035/Attempted-attack-
raises-airport-security-concerns 
30  In particular, at the time of the attempted terrorist attack, he had a multiple-
entry, m r visitor’s visa (also known as the B-2 visa).  Duncan Gardham, 
Stephen Adams & Martin Evans, Detroit Terror Attack Profile of Abdulmuta
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 28, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6896128/Detroit-
terror-attack-profile-of-Umar-Farou
both the U.S. and the European Union and implying that he received several visas 
from these jurisdictions to travel). 
31  See Adam Nossiter, Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terrorism Suspect, N.Y
TIMES
http://www.n
d=3
32 Id. 
33  This point has been made by several commentators including prominently 
by Adam Cohen, the chief legal correspondent at the Atlantic Monthly, in his blog.
See his Dec. 30, 2009 posting, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/why-heads-should-roll/33175/. 
34  Maureen Dowd, the New York Times op-ed writer was one such 
commentator.  Maureen Dowd, Captain Obvious Learns the Limits of Cool, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.
The inent blogger, Andrew Cohen, cites several opinion leaders expressing this 
view.  Cohen, supra note 33. 
35  Dowd makes precisely this point, supra note 34.  Dan Markel, Jennifer M. 
Collins, and Ethan J. Leib also discuss the d
whether to inform
Family Ties, 1147 U. ILL. L. REV. (2007).   
36  Id. 
37  Id. Indeed, media reports were filled with stories from Nigerians of similar 
social station who knew Abdulmutallab and his family, discussing signs of his 
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unremarkable; many societies have a metaphorical equivalent of the 
biblical Judas Iscariot narrative,38 signifying a deep aversion towards 
“snitches.”39 But against this prevailing wisdom — and despite the 
perceived damage snitching could do to his son, his family, his 
community, and his country — the interests of the elder Mutallab and 
the U.S. converged.  Father Mutallab, a paradigmatic member of the 
Nigerian Muslim elite, assumed the classic role of “snitch” and turned 
in his son.  Hence the subject of this Essay: How do we create 
incentives for elites to snitch on one another?  By articulating a duty to 
snitch, the U.S. would essentially be codifying the behavior of the 
elder Mutallab.   
 
What do I mean by a duty to snitch? This proposal is not concerned 
with criminal sanctions.40  Rather, it is concerned with another under-
                                                                                                                                            
ed Nigerians Express 
rs o
poff notes the universality of the Judas narrative.  Alexandra Natapoff, 
in
fts U.S. Image Around the 
rld 
 for 
nciples, it is doubtful 
increasing radicalism, while simultaneously expressing shock that one of their own 
could have engaged in a terrorist attack. Mary Chapman, Shock
Fea f Guilt By Association After Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/us/30detroit.html?_r=1;  
38  Judas Iscariot famously “snitched” on Jesus. Matthew 27:3-8 (King James 
Bible).  Nata
Snitch g: the Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 645, 
650 (2005). 
39  This antipathy appears to be particularly strong towards cooperation with 
the U.S. government, given the deep ambivalence among many Muslim elites, about 
U.S. foreign policy. Given the controversy attending U.S. policy towards “the 
Muslim world,” recent polling data has captured a deep distrust among Muslim 
populations towards U.S. foreign policy.  Although notably President Obama 
appears to be more popular in the Muslim world than President Bush, this distrust 
persisted even after President Obama assumed office in virtually all Muslim 
countries.  See Pew Global Attitude Project, which tracks attitudes towards the U.S. 
in Muslim countries.  PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, 2009, CONFIDENCE IN 
OBAMA LIFTS U.S. IMAGE AROUND THE WORLD: MOST MUSLIM PUBLICS NOT SO 
EASILY MOVED, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264.  In this 
respect, Nigeria appears to be an outlier. Although approximately half of the 
population is Muslim, a majority of Nigerians expressed positive views of the U.S. 
even during the Bush administration, whose policies were often controversial. Since 
the advent of the Obama administration, a poll in 2009 revealed that nearly 90% of 
Nigerians expressed positive attitudes towards the U.S. See summary Pew poll of 
Nigerian attitudes to the U.S, Confidence in Obama Li
Wo (July 23, 2009), available at 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264. 
40  The U.S. could hardly impose criminal sanctions on a foreigner overseas
a failure to snitch.  Indeed, given longstanding criminal law pri
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utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa-revocation. Elites 
value their U.S. market access and the revocation of such access is a 
serious sanction.  Under this proposal, each time that a visa holder 
commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which persons 
in her network knew of her tendencies and failed to report them.  
These persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a 
reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate 
at they had good reason not to know or not to report.     
eeply about the power 
f association to expose valuable information.  
th
 
This Essay is deliberately provocative.  Even in the absence of 
criminal sanctions, the imposition of a duty to “snitch” rightly causes 
discomfort.  It has a bad odor about it, recalling an earlier Cold War 
era when aliens had their visas revoked for suspected Communist 
associations (as demonstrated by their refusal to snitch on suspected 
American communist associates) and raising uncomfortable First 
Amendment questions.41 For this reason, even with technical fixes, the 
proposal may not only be un-implementable but also undesirable.  It 
bears emphasis: the point of this Essay is not to offer a feasible 
proposal, but instead to throw a metaphorical bomb and to raise 
uncomfortable “what if” questions.42  In so doing, I hope to provoke 
the sort of response that might typically be elicited by a thought 
experiment and to cause readers to think more d
o
 
Part I includes a more detailed discussion of Cox and Posner. In Part 
II, I focus on my primary subject, Abdulmutallab, assembling a rough 
reconstruction of what his visa-file might have looked like. Why 
Abdulmutallab? Through background interviews with national security 
experts, I learned that Abdulmutallab is an ideal subject to explore the 
challenges of ex post screening since he was radicalized after his visa 
was approved.  Moreover, it appears that the U.S.’s information 
                                                                                                                                            
the U.S. could impose such criminal sanctions on U.S. citizens in U.S. territory, 
absent affirmative collaboration in planning a terrorist attack. 
41 This history is summarized in John Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of 
Ideas: The Government, the Academy and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 1481 (1988). As a later footnote makes clear, First Amendment challenges are 
likely to fail. 
42 For this reason, it is not within the scope of this essay to address many other 
practical issues that might arise in the administration of this proposal, including 
questions of standards of proof and so forth.  
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concerning Abdulmutallab was what this Essay will term 
“insufficiently networked.” In the future, this deficiency may be 
remedied through the simple threat of strategic revocation of the visas 
of elites, who may be the peers of would-be terrorists. Notably, the 
U.S. is already strategic in visa revocation when pressing foreign 
policy goals are at stake, as evidenced by its revocation of the visas of 
Honduran elites in the aftermath of a Honduran coup. Additionally, 
this section also lays out two critical portions of the “duty to snitch,” 
amely the information-screening and sanctioning components, 
rominent motif in the communal retelling 
f Abdulmutallab’s narrative.  Snitching may be conceived as a pre-
insight apply in practice?  Prominent Islamic-American groups have 
n
drawing on the literature on collective sanctioning, and more broadly 
on network theory.   
 
In Part III, I shift from the primary subject, Abdulmutallab to the 
“snitch,” namely, the elder Mutallab.  Although motives are 
notoriously difficult to ascertain, it is important to consider the elder 
Mutallab’s potential motives– precisely because we hope to create 
incentives for similar behavior in others.   I include an analysis of his 
potential decision-making matrix incorporating insights from the 
Nigerian blogosphere and other sources. In a departure from most 
accounts, I suggest non-traditional motives.  A somewhat cynical 
game theory-inspired view would note that the elder Mutallab is a 
quintessential “repeat game” player with the U.S. As a banker, he is 
necessarily dependent on U.S. market access to conduct his business; 
snitching may be viewed as a pre-emptive mechanism of protecting his 
financial interests. Yet another view of Umarmutallab’s motives is 
nobler.  Nigerian society famously puts great stock on honor as a 
value.  Shame has been a p
o
emptive mechanism of mitigating an anticipated blow to familial, 
tribal and national honor.   
 
Notably, in this particular instance, communal norms appear to have 
already been working in the U.S.’s favor.  The U.S. may strategically 
deploy this prioritization of family honor as a mechanism for 
motivating persons to share important information.  How does this 
highlighted prosecutorial overkill namely, such as dragnets of Muslim 
14 
 
student visa-recipients conducted after 9/11.43 The key is to keep the 
community on the side of the authorities.  If terrorism is viewed as 
antithetical to family honor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa-
vocation may be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.  
s of all of the foregoing 
insights for U.S. immigration law and policy.  
Part I: Setting Up the Theoretical Problem 
                                                           
re
 
In Part IV, I discuss the metaphorical elephants in the room.  Writing 
in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement, Malcolm 
X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative duties (i.e., 
to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not to cause 
harm) on certain subsections of the society.  Although Malcolm X was 
speaking specifically in reference to African-American Muslims, his 
point was much broader, namely, that such actions may alienate 
precisely those portions of the population whose support the law 
enforcement authorities need.44  There is also a concern regarding the 
McCarthyite penumbra associated with a duty to snitch.  Moreover, 
the U.S. will need to guard against corruption of the process more 
generally, particularly given the dangers of elite capture. For example, 
elites may deliberately share inaccurate information to discredit 
competitors.  Finally, I address the implication
 
 
 
Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations. The Council on American 
Islamic relations, the largest Muslim lobby group has been particularly vocal in this 
43  This point has been made by several members of the umbrella advocacy 
group, the American Muslim Political Coordination Council, including the Muslim 
Public Affairs Council, the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim 
regard.  See, generally, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF 
MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(2002), http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2002Report.aspx; see 
also PEW RESEARCH CENTER,  MUSLIMS IN AMERICA (2007), 
http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf; see also Omar Sacibey, 
Muslims look to blacks for civil rights guidance, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, May 16, 
2006, http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10521 (documenting the 
concerns of Muslim lobby groups regarding prosecutorial heavy-handedness).  
44  BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND A LETTER BY 
MALCOLM X. (George Breitman (ed.)) (1970), see also MALCOLM X THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (with the assistance of Alex Haley) (1992); 
MANNING MARABLE, ON MALCOLM X: HIS MESSAGE & MEANING (1992). 
15 
 
a. Historical context for institutional design choices: 
Why ex post screening has been neglected 
 
Congress has charged the Executive branch with screening for a 
dizzyingly large spectrum of alien “types,” from highly skilled 
computer scientists,45 to wealthy investors,46 to aliens of 
“extraordinary ability”47 to low-skilled guest workers.48 Screening 
millions of applicants for a wide range of specific types should 
typically require institutions that are finely tuned to such goals.   
owever, a primary source of what one scholar has termed 
 can hardly be overstated: their institutional design focus 
as enormous consequence for real-life questions of how immigration 
so troubling.  
 
                                                           
H
immigration “dysfunction” is that institutions are poorly designed for a 
primary function – namely, screening.49 Cox and Posner’s exploration 
of the comparative advantages of ex ante versus ex post screening in 
institutional design has the potential to alleviate such dysfunction. 50 
 
This is not an obscure academic issue. The importance of Cox and 
Posner’s work
h
law has historically been enforced.51 Indeed, it is precisely because 
their work is so important that their failure to appreciate the 
importance of ex post screening in the context of the highly skilled is 
45  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (containing H(1)(B) provisions for the 
admission of the highly skilled). 
46  See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be issued to 
immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that 
generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful residents; these are 
generally known as “E” Treaty Investor Visas) 
47  See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing for visas to be issued to 
immigrants of "extraordinary ability" or who are "outstanding" with a significant 
likelihood of making innovative contributions to the American economy); and 
§1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants with advanced academic 
training or who possess "exceptional ability").  
48  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (containing  guest worker provisions). 
49  An excellent discussion of how what he terms systemic “dysfunction” in the 
immigration system is augmented by the challenges of screening is contained in 
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
50    See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. 
51  A good summary of the implications of institutional design for “real life” 
decision making is contained in also contained in Cuellar, supra note 49. 
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But in at least one sense, this oversight is also unsurprising. The 
federal government only began to restrict immigration in the late 19th 
century and even then, there were no provisions making immigrants 
deportable for post entry conduct.52 These provisions were only 
troduced in 1907 and significantly expanded over the last century.53 
n 
olicies were liberal.  There was little need for a complicated system 
to determine which migrants merited admission. This was particularly 
58
                                               
in
However, as a matter of practice, ex post screening was focused on the 
poor and low-skilled, as opposed to elites.54  
 
To support this point, some broad historical context is in order. 
Zolberg’s landmark historical study of migration contends that prior to 
the development of modern transportation and communications, 
typically, very few persons left their countries of origin.55 Even these 
migrants customarily had some pre-existing connection to the country 
of migration. Moreover, migrants generally met relatively little 
resistance at the port of entry.56 Zolberg notes that great “powers” 
such as France and Great Britain liberally admitted migrants from their 
broader colonial empires.57 The overall thrust of his historical analysis 
is clear: generally, the numbers of migrants were small, and admissio
p
true in the U.S., which has been singularly welcoming to migrants.  
              
NTAL LAW 1-25 (1996) . 
 
g to their economic 
921
DA2349D55444994EE21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA9
8FE9 63
f the 
s governing U.S. immigration. His work discusses the 
52  See Introduction to GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAME
53  Id. 
54  ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN:  IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 436 (2006). 
55 Introduction to ZOLBERG, supra note 54. 
56  It bears emphasis that post-entry, migrants often found significant hostility 
in adjusting to their new homes. Id at 50. 
57  Even other empires that proved more resistant to long-term migration, such 
as the Germans, liberally admitted short-term migrants accordin
dictates. The Germans typically denied migrants long-term membership. For a 
discussion of the historical German approach to migrants, see e.g., Patrick Weil, All 
or Nothing? What the United States Can Learn from Europe at 
http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F
ADCBE5588F8A52
565 FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D27
34C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04 (German Marshall Fund, last visited 
January 10, 2011). 
58  Zolberg, supra note 54 at 57. Professor Neuman’s historical analysis of 
American immigration law suggests a different interpretation than Zolberg’s o
development of the rule
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All this changed in the 20th Century. The World Bank has argued that 
a defining feature of the 20th Century was that people started to move 
at previously unparalleled levels. 59 With unprecedented levels of 
migration, came domestic political resistance to new migrants in 
diverse countries. Social and economic pressures (from the Great 
Depression to nativist political parties and so forth) culminated in a 
similar outcome in different states:60 more stringent rules across the 
oard in an effort to stem the flow of new migrants.61   
uch better 
 determine whether a migrant was inadmissible ex ante.64  
b
 
Yet even so, prior to the relatively recent development of the modern 
state, it was difficult for the state to locate, exclude and deport 
undesirable migrants.62  As a practical matter of limited state capacity, 
overwhelmingly, states focused on ex-ante screening.63 The U.S. was 
no different.  If deportation was hardly a realistic policy option for a 
young country with a still poorly developed state, it was m
to
 
In the early 20th century, this changed. Why the new focus on ex post 
screening? Among many possible factors, a structural change in the 
nature of migration appears to be the primary factor. For most of U.S. 
history, migrants were overwhelmingly documented entrants who 
came through seaports.  The nature of migration changed with 
increasing numbers of undocumented migrants from Mexico and 
Central America crossing at land borders, which were much more 
                                                                                                                                            
development of complicated immigration rules at the state level early in the U.S. 
Republic. See Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of US Immigration Law, 93 
COLUMB. L. REV. 183. 
59    The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report that worldwide labor 
mobility trends will lead migration to remain at the center of contentious political 
debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006:  
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 72 (2009).  In the last 
h income countries has dthree decades, the population of migrants in hig
n annual growth rate of 3%. WORLD B
oubled, 
isteri ANK, supra, at 26–27.  Migrants 
e population worldwide, and 8.3% of the population 
See generally LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE 
E:  B KING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY (2006). 
RLD BANK, supra note 59, at 26–27.   
reg ng a
now constitute nearly 2.9% of th
f industrialized countries. Id.  o
COM REA
60  WO
61  Id. 
62 Zolberg, supra note 54 at 70. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
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difficult to police than sea ports.65  In the face of this type of 
migration, an e
 
xclusive focus on ex ante exclusion became 
nachronistic. 66  
y recently, with a 
ignificant spike in ex post screening after 9/11.67 
 
b. Ex poste screening as  the dominant strategy 
federal criminal prosecutions.69 Additionally, the increased emphasis 
a
 
Ex post screening offered an alternative strategy. However, even after 
ex post screening measures developed, there was minimal ex post 
screening of the highly skilled until relativel
s
 
Ex poste screening is no longer just an alternative strategy. It is now 
arguably the primary mechanism of immigration enforcement. The 
evidence is significant: immigration authorities currently expend more 
resources on ex post screening than on ex ante screening.68  Consider, 
for example, the burgeoning federal law enforcement focus on 
“crimmigration,” that is, the prosecution and deportation of aliens who 
commit crime. Immigration cases now constitute the majority of all 
                                                           
65  The landmark work in this regard has been conducted by Douglas M
at the Office of Population Research at Princeton Universi
assey 
ty, who has analyzed 
xican , DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, 
GE D ICAN 
Y, 
s well made in a report by the Center for Strategic and 
rnati
sion on Scientific Communications and National Security 
p://w
as gained 
 
a 
 the 
Me  migratory patterns over the last century. See, e.g.
JOR URAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS:  MEX
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2002); DOUGLAS S. MASSE
Borderline Madness:  America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in 
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (CAROL SWAIN, ed. 2008). 
66  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. 
67  This point i
Inte onal Studies. See  “Security Controls on the Access of Foreign Scientists 
and Engineers to the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Commis
(htt ww.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/ 
task,view/id,1921). 
68  See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 
(2007). 
69  Cox and Posner do not utilize the word “crimmigration,” which h
greater currency since the publication of their article. However, they clearly 
reference the increasing utilization of federal enforcement resources to identify and
deport aliens who have committed relatively minor crimes. See Cox & Posner, supr
note 1, at 813.  For an excellent summary of the data concerning the significant 
increase in federal immigration prosecutions, see David Sklansky, Crime 
Immigration and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with
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on post-entry screening is reflected in the fact that immigration law 
often treats post-entry criminal behavior (in the U.S.) much more 
harshly than equivalent pre-entry behavior criminal behavior (in a 
migrant’s country of origin).70  Indeed, a conviction that is not a 
ground for excluding a first-time arriving alien may well constitute 
grounds for deportation of a long-time permanent resident.71  
 
Cox and Posner’s singular contribution is to offer a “macro” bird’s eye 
view that provides critical context for this trend.  In their view, a 
primary reason for this institutional bias for post-entry as opposed to 
pre-entry screening is information asymmetry. An alien must typically 
commit in her visa application to abide by the rules governing the visa 
in the event that she is eventually approved.72 A potential migrant will 
generally know more about herself and whether she will abide by the 
rules than a consular officer.73  The disproportionate focus on post-
entry screening reflects the fact that the U.S. is often better able to 
access reliable information about aliens once they are in the country.74  
 
Questions of information asymmetry are most acute with respect to 
low-skilled aliens. 75 The typical low skilled migrant lacks the 
traditional documentary mechanisms of credibly establishing that she 
is likely to be a law-abiding, productive contributor. 76  She is less 
likely than the typical high-skilled applicant, to provide traditional and 
tangible evidence of traits that are proxies for desirable “type” (such as 
                                                                                                                                            
author). This issue is also discussed in the following articles. See generally 
Legomsky, supra note 68 at 480; Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent 
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); 
Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 
, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 
11). 
generally Legomsky, supra note 68 at 480.  
 State Visa Application, available at 
s://ev
uss this issue in detail in 
eviou ntribution. See Brown, supra note 3, at 2488. 
wn, supra note 3, at 2499. 
135 (2009); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).  For a recent addition to this 
literature
(20
70  See 
71  Id. 
72  See e.g., DS-156: Department of
http isaforms.state.gov/ds156.asp,   
73  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1,  at 811. I also disc
a pr s co
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76 Bro
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graduation certificates).77 Moreover, the typical low-skilled migrant 
comes from a developing country with poorly-resourced and 
sometimes corrupt public institutions.78 Thus, individual-level 
constraints are augmented by nationwide resource and governance 
constraints, which undermine a potential migrant’s efforts to provide 
evidence (such as credible police reports)79 from the authorities of her 
inclination to play by the rules.   Thus, the resource challenges of the 
eveloping world augment the challenges of information collection. In 
summ lenges. 
ening when it comes to migrants with elite credentials.  
he information asymmetry rationale is less compelling for skilled 
                                                           
d
ary, ex post screening mitigates these chal
 
c. Cox and Posner’s oversight 
 
Cox and Posner’s analysis is generally positive as opposed to 
normative.80 That is, they are generally concerned with illuminating 
which factors lead to immigration screening choices, as opposed to 
criticizing these choices. Thus, they are generally agnostic as to 
whether a state should typically pursue ex ante or ex post screening.81 
However, they come closest to critiquing the disproportionate focus on 
ex post scre
T
migrants.82 
 
In contrast to their low-skilled counterparts, the educational elite are 
well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they have been law-
abiding, productive community members in their country of origin, 
such as university diplomas, professional affiliations and evidence of 
business ownership.83 Indeed, this is precisely why other jurisdictions 
such as Canada and Australia have been able to develop “points” 
systems, which reward highly skilled migrants with expedited visa 
access.84 Not only are highly skilled migrants able to provide 
77  Id. 
78  The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this 
population that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 
57–58. 
79  Id. 
80  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id 
84  See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and 
Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006). 
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documentary evidence of their academic, professional, and business 
credentials. In the modern age of information technology, the DHS, 
working with the State Department, can easily verify an elite 
applicant’s credentials, even thousands of miles away in India or 
China.85 Consequently, the U.S., like its other developed-country 
counterparts has access to highly detailed, fine-grained information 
bout the highly skilled, irrespective of where they live.86 
into) the U.S., when she may later be found to be an 
                                                           
a
Accordingly, the U.S. has less justification for their ex post focus.87 
 
There is another reason that Cox and Posner are disturbed by the 
disproportionate ex post focus. Historically, U.S. migration has 
involved an implicit long-term contract, which has been termed 
“immigration as contract.”88 If persons are well-behaved, they are 
generally viewed as “Americans in waiting” and are eligible for long-
term membership through naturalization.89 An emphasis on ex post 
screening (with the corresponding “sanction” of deportation)90 implies 
that the U.S. may later revoke this implicit contract. Herein lies the 
dilemma: risk-averse, but talented high-skilled persons who are ideal 
migrants may decline to migrate to the U.S.   More bluntly put, why 
should a computer programmer invest in migration to (and 
assimilation 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  The phrase “immigration as contract” has been heavily utilized by 
Motomura. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING (2006). See 
also Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815. 
88  The term “Americans in waiting,” which gained currency in recent 
immigrants’ rights protests is originally Motomura’s. Id. See also Adam B. Cox & 
Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (2009) (applying a similar metaphor of a “contract” 
between the state and the migrant). 
89  Id. 
90  One might question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be 
construed as a sanction.  If an alien does not abide by the terms of her visa, and the 
host country deports her, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual 
obligation that the alien agreed to (as a condition of her visa) in the first place?  
Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in the immigration law literature as to whether 
deportation should in fact be viewed as a punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that “an order of deportation is not a 
punishment for crime”); cf. Legomsky, supra note 68(arguing that theories of 
deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment that 
deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment). 
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inappropriate “type” and subject to deportation?  Why not go instead 
wth, an institutional framework not well-suited 
 such recruitment continues to undermine efforts to recruit highly 
                                                           
to Canada?  
 
There is significant evidence that skilled migrants contribute 
disproportionately to U.S. economic growth.91 Additionally, their 
children are also likely to be highly productive. For example, New 
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman discusses the children of 
skilled immigrants who dominate the Spelling Bee and Intel Science 
competitions, and ultimately go on to work and form high tech 
companies.92 While a broad array of lobby groups agree that 
successful global recruitment of the highly skilled is essential to long-
term U.S. economic gro
to
skilled immigrants.93   
 
Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns; they are conscious 
of and disinclined to contribute further to this poor institutional 
framework.94 Thus, they express a preference for ex ante screening in 
the context of the highly-skilled. 95 In their words, “the main 
91  A brief summary of this literature is included in Shachar, supra note 84.  
For a good introduction to the global competition for skilled persons see Introduction 
to MICHAEL PORTER ON COMPETITION (2008). See also Bump, Micah and B. 
Lindsay Lowell, 2006. “Global Competition for International Students,” Institute for 
the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University; Paula Stephan, & 
Sharon Levin, Exceptional contributions to U.S. science by the foreign-born and 
foreign-educated, POP. RES.  &  POL. REV. 20 (1):59–79 (2001); AnnaLee Saxenian, 
Silicon Valley’s new immigrant high-growth entrepreneurs, ECON. DEV. QUART. 16 
(1) 1:20–31 (2002); William Kerr, Ethnic scientific communities and international 
technology diffusion, REV. ECON. & STAT. 90(3):518–37 (2008); Gnanaraj Chellaraj, 
Keith Maskus & Aaditya Mattoo, The contribution of skilled immigrations and 
international graduate students to U.S. innovation, REV. OF INT. ECON. 16 (3):444–
62 (2008); William Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B 
Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention, J. OF LAB. ECON. 28 (3): 473-508 (2010); 
Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-013 (2011) (On file with author); 
Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing & Gary Gereffi, America’s new 
immigrant entrepreneurs I, Working Paper, Duke University (2007) (on file with 
author); Madeline Zavodny, The H-1B program and its effects on information 
technology workers, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 3:1–11 (2008). 
92  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19. 
93  This point is made by Cuellar. See Cuellar, supra note 49. 
94  See Cox & Posner, supra note 1,  at 815. 
95  Id. 
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advantage of the ex ante system is that it reduces the risk faced by 
potential immigrants that they will be deported, so that risk-averse 
oncitizens are more likely to enter and invest in the country than they 
reover, the highly skilled are also most likely to gain 
ccess to the U.S. They are also singularly well-prepared to execute 
t section, I 
onsider how this goal might be accomplished through the lens of 
Abdulmutallab and other highly skilled terrorist subjects.  
 
 
: Abdulmutallab 
. consulate in 
                                                           
n
are under the ex post system.”96 
 
This Essay points out a critical oversight in Cox and Posner’s 
framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post 
mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this problematic? 
U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the horns of a 
dilemma. While the highly skilled are clearly critical to U.S. economic 
growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting among the 
highly skilled. Mo
a
terrorist attacks.  
 
The bottom line: While Cox and Posner are correct in stating that ex 
ante screening may be more appropriate for elites, ex post screening is 
still critical. What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post 
screening that meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining 
efforts to recruit the best and the brightest. In the nex
c
 
Part II
 
a. A Note on Methodology 
 
A word on methodology is in order. In this section, my primary 
subject is Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian “Underwear” bomber, and elite 
engineering graduate who received a multiple-year, multiple-entry 
visitor’s visa.  As a Nigerian national, Abdulmutallab would have been 
required to submit his visa application at a U.S. consulate in Nigeria.97 
The question becomes: What was available to the U.S
96  Id. 
97  This requirement is stipulated by the State Department Visa Rules. See 
http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html 
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Nigeria on both an ex ante and ex post basis? I consider how the 
consular authorities might have “filled in the blanks.”   
Typically, visa-files are not available for public view. Moreover, for 
obvious reasons, subsequent law enforcement interviews with terror 
suspects are classified. Thus, I am only able to create a rough re-
enaction of what a subject’s visa-file might have contained.  In an 
effort to find an ideal subject, I created a narrow list of potential 
subjects, including only elites who had either carried out or attempted 
to carry out a terrorist attack. In order to further narrow down this list, 
I interviewed persons with national security 
98
expertise. While 
bdulmutallab was not a long-term migrant,  repeatedly, he was 
, particularly in the subject’s tightly-
A
recommended by such experts as a subject choice.  
 
This recommendation primarily arises from the fact that 
Abdulmutallab was the subject of extensive reporting, by not only the 
Western press, but also the Nigerian press. It appears that Nigerian 
journalists were able to access on-the-ground sources, which were 
more difficult for foreign correspondents to find. Why is this relevant? 
Notably, it was the Nigerian (as opposed to the U.S.) press, which first 
reported that Abdulmutallab’s father had visited the U.S. consulate 
repeatedly to raise concerns about his son.99 Nigerian journalists have 
been essential to Western media outlets (and indeed to this Essay). In 
comparison to other countries from which elite terror suspects have 
originated, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, Nigeria is more 
highly ranked on indices of press freedom. This perhaps enabled more 
rigorous on-the-ground reporting
                                                           
98 It bears emphasis: Abdulmutallab was not admitted as a long-term 
immigrant. Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening 
immigrants (that is, persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly 
citizenship).  However, they point out that their analytical framework is also 
licab llab. 
ger, NEXT (an online 
.csp. (consolidating a variety of 
rian .S. 
app le to the challenges of admitting temporary guests such as Abdulmuta
Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813–14. 
99  See e.g., Dora Akunyulim, Mutallab is a Stran
Nigerian news consolidator), Dec. 28, 2009, 
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5503108-
147/Mutallab_is_a_stranger,_Dora_Akunyili
Nige newspaper outlets which reported that Father Mutallab had visited the U
consulate repeatedly to voice his concerns). 
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knit Muslim community.100  This has typically not occurred in other 
etailed news accounts which allowed 
e to assemble a rough reconstruction of information that might have 
een missing from his visa file.  
 
                                                           
terror suspects’ home countries. 
 
Moreover my research was also aided considerably by extensive 
reporting by European news outlets.  What accounts for their interest? 
Although Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S. 
bound flight, he could just have made a similar attempt in the 
European Union (“E.U.”) given his easy access to several E.U. 
countries.  Indeed, Abdulmutallab boarded the U.S. bound flight in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, he had previously received multiple E.U. 
(Schengen) visas, which authorized admission to many E.U. member 
states.101 Abdulmutallab had also previously received a U.K. student 
visa. It appears that only one state – the U.K. – rejected his application 
for visa renewal (presumably on the basis of ex post screening, since 
he had previously received a visa).  Thus, in several different 
jurisdictions, journalists were seeking to determine why their own 
immigration authorities had failed to successfully screen him.102 This 
accounts for the availability of d
m
b
 
b. Abdulmutallab’s Visa Application 
 
100  See the 2009 Index of Press Freedom published by Reporters without 
dom
 
es 
missions 
 
/ec.europa.eu/home-
rs/p
 
twork of family and friends appear to have 
n mo
Borders. While Nigeria is still in the bottom half, it is clearly more highly ranked 
than all the other countries mentioned. See Reporters Without Borders, 2009 Press 
Free  Index at http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001. 
101  The Netherlands is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, a treaty (signed
near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg), between five of the ten member stat
of the European Economic Community.  The Treaty created the Schengen Area 
through the complete abolition of border controls between Schengen states, common 
rules on visas, and police and judicial cooperation. Thus, in order to gain ad
to the Netherlands, Abdulmutallab needed a Schengen visa.  See European
Commission: Home Affairs, Schengen Area at http:/
affai olicies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm.  
102  Additionally, his family’s extensive ties to the U.K. enabled particularly 
detailed reporting by the British press.  In contrast to the family and friends of other
would-be bombers, Abdulmutallab’s ne
bee re cooperative with the press. 
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A consideration of Abdulmutallab’s network is enlightening.  He went 
to one of Africa’s most exclusive private schools, the British School of 
Togo, to which very few Africans gain admission, and which even 
fewer can afford to attend.103  He studied there for the prestigious 
International Baccalaureate examination.104  While he was denied 
admission to Stanford University, he did well sufficiently well in his 
high school examinations, to attend the University of London’s highly 
selective engineering prog  105
106
ram.  While there, he achieved an honors 
ngineering degree.   In London, he lived in a family apartment in 
available to any Nigerian national who is not a visa-overstay or 
d what a 
                                 
e
one of the city’s chicest districts.107  He was surrounded by relatives 
and friends who were part of a tightly knit group of rich Nigerian 
expatriates in London.108  
 
Abdulmutallab had a multiple-entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa, also 
known as the B-2 visa.109  Although this visa-category is in principle 
security risk, in practice the documentary requirements are so 
stringent that only a tiny minority of elite Nigerians are typically 
gible.110  In the Nigerian context, Abdulmutallab achieveeli
                          
009, 
mfort). 
 tra .S., actu
103  Gardham et al., supra note 30.  
104  Peter Walker, Xan Rice and Richard Norton-Taylor, Rich and Privileged – 
The Gilded Life of the Would-Be Plane Bomber, GUARDIAN UK, Dec. 27, 2
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/27/gilded-life-of-plane-bomber. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id., but see, Xan Rice, Bombing Suspect Was Pious Pupil Who Shunned the 
Life of the Rich, GUARDIAN UK, Dec. 31, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/31/bombing-suspect-abdulmutallab-
nigeria-home (noting that his affluence appeared to have caused him some 
disco
108  Gardham et al, supra note 30. 
109 A B-2 visa is granted to a foreigner seeking to enter the U.S. for tourism 
purposes.  See INA § 214 (b). The Nigerian Information Minister noted that he 
“sneaked into” Nigeria, implying that the Nigeria security forces were on alert and 
would have detained him if he had stopped in Nigeria.   See Akunyulim, supra note 
99. 
110  While approximately 68% of Nigerian applicants for non-immigrant visas 
are approved, against a background in which most Nigerians express positive views 
of the U.S. and a desire to vel to the U very few Nigerians ally apply for 
visas suggesting that either that the airplane and visa application fees are prohibitive 
or the documentation requirements are widely perceived to be difficult.  See 
summary Pew poll of Nigerian attitudes to the U.S. at 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264. The percentage of 
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former Ambassador has termed an exclusive badge of honor – namely 
a U.S. visa.111 
 
In the aftermath of Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing, DHS was 
accused of having missed important clues while screening.112  The 
U.S. presumably had many mechanisms of verifying Abdulmutallab’s 
bona fides.  His ties to formal institutions were well documented, his 
family was prominent, and he was well known at his schools.113  He 
appears to have had a detailed paper trail.  
 
The centrality of contesting claims regarding the ease of screening the 
young Mutallab obscures an important point - in this particular 
                                                                                                                                            
Nigerians with non-immigrant visas is miniscule.  See a summary of the figures, 
STATE DEPARTMENT, ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATES at 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08.pdf. In 2008, 31,000 Nigerians received non-
immigrant visas. See STATE DEPARTMENT, NON IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED at  
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AnnualReportTableXVII.pdf. This is a tiny 
percentage of the general population. Approximately 0.03% of Nigerians applied for 
non-immigrant visas and 0.02% were approved. To provide some context as to what 
a miniscule percentage of the Nigerian population has non-immigrant visas, consider 
the similar rates for Jamaica, another developing country.  Although Jamaica is a 
much smaller country with 1.7% of Nigeria’s population and has similar visa-
approval rates, a much higher percentage of Jamaicans apply for (and thus receive) 
non-immigrant visas.  For example, in 2008, approximately, 64% of non-immigrant 
Jamaican visa applicants received non-immigrant visas.   STATE DEPARTMENT, 
ADJUSTED VISA REFUSAL RATES.  http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08.pdf.  45,000 
Jamaicans received non-immigrant visas. See STATE DEPARTMENT, NON-
IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AnnualReportTableXVII.pdf. However, since 
Jamaica only has a population of 2.7 million people, 1.6% of Jamaicans were 
recipients of non-immigrant visas in 2008.   See generally, CENTER FOR 
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, NO COYOTE NEEDED (2006) at 
http://www.cis.org/us_visas_still_easy_to_get.html. 
111  This view was expressed by the Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John 
Campbell. See infra text accompanying note 151 (“Nigerian elites relish the 
opportunity to travel to the U.S. and to own property there.”) 
112  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Antiterror Chief, a Rough Week Ahead as 
Hearings Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/us/politics/17leiter.html; Eric Lipton, Eric 
Schmidt, Mark Mazzetti, Review of Jet Bomb Plot Show More Missed Clues, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/us/18intel.html; Eric 
Lipton and Scott Shane, Questions on Why Suspect Was Not Stopped, N. Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/us/28terror.html. 
113  Stolberg, supra note 112 
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context, screening raises peculiar concerns.  Since even applicants for 
temporary tourist visas are presumed under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) to have immigrant intent, the burden is on the 
average applicant to prove that she is coming to the U.S. temporarily 
nd does not intend to abandon her country of origin.114  As such, the 
t would 
e his history of travel without visa-overstays. Moreover, his previous 
 
                                                           
a
typical visa recipient must successfully demonstrate significant ties to 
her country of origin and financial assets to support herself while 
visiting the U.S.115  
 
As evidence of home-country ties, Abdulmutallab’s visa application 
would typically have noted his extensive family in Nigeria.  As 
evidence of his ability to support himself while in the U.S., it would 
undoubtedly have noted his family’s significant asset base, including 
major shareholdings in several companies and valuable real estate in 
the E.U. and the U.S.  Further evidence of non-immigrant inten
b
studies at an elite boarding school and at an elite engineering program 
would also be relevant since it would typically be difficult for well-
educated persons to work as undocumented aliens in the U.S.  
114  See INA §§ 101, 214 (a)(1) (“The admission to the United States of any 
alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the 
Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . .  to insure that at the expiration of 
such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or to 
maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 248 , such alien will depart 
from the United States. [ . . . ]; (b) Every alien 10/ (other than a nonimmigrant 
described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than a 
nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except 
subclause (b1) of such section) shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he 
establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a 
visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is 
entitled to a nonimmigrant status.”)  
115 See also U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html, (“The 
presumption in the law is that every visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant.    
Therefore, applicants for visitor visas must overcome this presumption by 
demonstrating that: The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S. for business, 
pleasure, or medical treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited 
period; Evidence of funds to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of 
compelling social and economic ties abroad; and That they have a residence outside 
the U.S. as well as other binding ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of 
the visit.”) 
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Indeed, on the basis of a typical ex ante screen, Abdulmutallab would 
not have looked substantially different than any other well-educated 
and wealthy Nigerian. As one interview subject pointed out, without 
the benefit of hindsight bias,116 Abdulmutallab’s profile is not 
substantially different than that of Adebayo Ogunlesi, another well-
educated Nigerian national who first came to the U.S. as a young man.  
He subsequently went on to graduate from Harvard Business School, 
become an Editor of the Harvard Law Review, a Supreme Court clerk 
and Vice-Chairman of Credit Suisse.117 Indeed, Ogunlesi is precisely 
the sort of elite that Cox and Posner are worried about deterring. 
Moreover, Abdulmutallab’s profile is not discernibly different from 
many other
 
 well-educated Nigerians who now constitute the largest 
roup of foreign-trained doctors in the U.S.118 How could a visa-
resident 
bama.   A consular officer would also not have anticipated his 
                                                           
g
officer be reasonably expected to differentiate Abdulmutallab from 
this pool?  
 
Moreover, Ambdulmutallab reminds us that the profiles of elite visa-
recipients may change in critical ways after they first receive their 
visas. What the consular offer could not have anticipated is 
Abdulmutallab’s time at a religious training institute in Yemen run by 
an American imam, whose role in training terrorists is apparently so 
significant that his assassination has been authorized by P
119O
leadership role of a student Islamic society that was well-known for 
inviting radical speakers to his London university campus. 120 
116  See infra text accompanying note 168. 
117  This point was made to me in an interview with the Nigerian-American 
journalist and Daily Beast contributor, Dayo Olapode who herself wrote about 
Abdulmutallab . See 
http://www.time.com/time/2002/globalinfluentials/gbiogunlesi.html (discussing the 
elite credentials of Adebayo Ogunlesi) 
118  Nigerian nationals have now surpassed Indian nationals as the largest 
number of foreign trained doctors in the U.S. Source: Speech of Nigerian Finance 
Minister, Ngozi  Okonjo-Iweala to the Bank of Nova Scotia, February, 2006.  
119 Nossiter, supra note 31. See also Scott Shane, U.S. Approval of Killing 
Cleric Causes Unease, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/world/14awlaki.html (discussing the influence 
of a Yemeni-American cleric on several would-be bombers). 
120 Venetia Thompson, My Classmate, The Plane Bomber, DAILY BEAST, Dec. 
30, 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-30/my-
classmate-the-undie-bomber/p/. 
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Although elites are typically in a much better position than non-elite 
visa applicants to submit detailed paper trails, screening on an ex ante 
basis is complicated by the fact that their resources allow them to 
obscure “red flags,” such as travel to countries on terrorist watch lists.  
For example, Abdulmutallab’s passport bore no Yemeni entry stamp 
although he traveled there repeatedly, presumably because he had the 
resources to bribe Yemeni immigration officials.121 He is likely to 
have omitted this information from any application for U.S. visa-
newal.  Indeed, this was also true of the would-be Times Square 
 no 
nger matched the US visa “types;” they underwent extreme 
visa-applications were delayed or denied, there emerged myriad 
ativ as of elites subsequent to their 
pta s 
re
bomber, Shahzad.  He was able to obscure another clear “red flag,” 
namely, his repeated trips to an al Qaeda stronghold in Pakistan.  
 
The bottom line: These facts reinforce the critical nature of Cox and 
Posner’s omission.  Aliens, like all people, are not static personalities. 
Both Abdulmutallab and Shahzad’s profiles changed such that they
lo
radicalization only after they received their first U.S. visas.  Thus, they 
would probably not have been excluded through ex ante screening. 
 
Arguably it is precisely because of this challenge that in the aftermath 
of 9/11, the U.S. panicked and “overreached,” in its ex post screening 
of elites.122 In addition to plentiful stories of Muslim elites whose 
narr es of revocations of the vis
acce nce of positions in the U.S. 123 Indeed, U.S. universitie
                                                           
121  Lipton and Shane, supra note 112. 
122  For the best summary of this data, see B. Lindsay Lowell, et. al, Foreign 
Students Coming to the U.S., The Impact of Policy, Procedures and Economi
Competition, , INSTITUTE FOR THE STU
c 
DY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 
Stu
that of Tariq 
nt: 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (2007), available at 
http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isim/Publications/SloanMaterials/Foreign%20
dents%20Coming%20to%20America.pdf; see also Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, supra note 71. 
123 While there were several cases, the most prominent case was 
Ramadan, the Swiss-Egyptian scholar who accepted an endowed Chair at Notre 
Dame, prior to the revocation of his visa. A good summary of the exclusion of 
several Muslim elites including Ramadan is included in George Packer, Comme
Keep Out, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006, at 59, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/talk/061016ta talk packer (discussing the 
visa-revocation of several prominent Muslims including Ramadan whose visa was 
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asserted that they were losing recruits, because scholars were 
unwilling to subject themselves to the stigma of potential visa 
revocation, a problem that they also experienced during the McCarthy 
era.124 Such criticism of the post 9/11 dragnet125 reinforces the point 
that screening must be narrow and targeted. 126 Mohammed Atta is 
one engineer of Middle Eastern origin. Another is Pierre Omidyar, the 
Founder of eBay. It is unclear that such dragnets distinguish between 
the Attas and the Omidyars of this world. With these sorts of screening 
techniques, could the next immigrant Nobel Laureate would end up 
lsewhere?  
ssed the relevant information? This is the subject 
f the next section.  
                                                                                                                                         
e
 
What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post screening that 
meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining efforts to recruit 
the best and the brightest. The question then becomes, how could the 
authorities have acce
o
 
 
    
voked on the basis of his $770 in donations between 1998 and 2002 to a pro-
alestinian French charity that was added to the federal government’s list of 
designated terrorist organizations in 2003, on suspicion that the charity channeled 
money to Hamas).  
re
P
124  See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, “Statement and Recommendations on Visa 
Problems Harming America’s Scientific, Economic, and Security Interests (2004), 
available at http://www7. nationalacademies.org/visas/Statement%20on%20Visa 
%20Problems.pdf; Robert Sedgwick, “Education Professionals Caution about 
Potential Fallout from Sept. 11, WORLD EDUCATION NEWS AND REVIEWS, (Jan./Feb. 
2002), available at http://www. wes.org/ewenr/02jan/feature.htm; INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT, Comparative Study on Policies 
Toward Foreign Students: Study on Admission and Retention Policies towards 
Foreign Students in Industrialized Counties (2004); “International Center for 
Migration Policy Development, Vienna Austria; Janine Keil  “Voices of Hope, 
Voices of Frustration, ” INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY (2007), available at http://isd.georgetown.edu/ISD_Visa_ Report. pdf ). 
125 In the aftermath of 9/11, the then competent immigration authority, the 
Immigration and Naturalization service provided information to the FBI which 
allowed them to detain university students of Middle Eastern origin for additional 
inspection in what was widely viewed as a “dragnet.” See Lowell et al., supra note 
122. 
126  Indeed, one paper contends that domestic restrictions on civil rights have 
been shown to reduce elite migration to the U.S.  See David Karemera et. al, “A 
Gravity Model Analysis of International Migration to North America, APPLIED 
ECONOMICS, 32(13): 1745-55 (2000).  
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ddle-
lass Saudis, there was little doubt that they were educational elites.  
ent 
at Al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to move “up” the food 
highly regarded doctor who placed very well in the Jordanian national 
s.130  His wife was a Turkish author of some repute.131 Indeed, he 
 
 
c. The Situation Then and Now 
 
In the months following 9/11, detailed hearings laid bare the historical 
difficulty that the U.S. had in penetrating terrorist networks.127 Much 
was made of the failures of human intelligence.128  Most disturbing 
was the fact that many of the 9/11 hijackers appeared to be operating 
in the clear light of day.  These young engineers were widely 
recognized in their universities, their mosques, and more broadly in 
their communities.  Although they were typically described as mi
c
They had graduated from elite Saudi universities with highly technical 
engineering degrees.  Many people had reason to know their 
tendencies towards radicalism and notably, no one had snitched.  
 
Fast forward to the present.  Nearly ten years after 9/11, it is appar
th
chain by attracting even more elite participants.129 The list of recent 
high profile suicide bombers reads like a “who’s who” of elites in their 
countries of origin.  Consider, for example, the following persons.  
 
Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, the Al-Qaeda affiliated suicide 
bomber who killed several CIA operatives in Afghanistan, was a 
exam
                                                           
127 The findings of these hearings are most comprehensively captured in the 
report of the 9/11 Commission popularly known as the “9/11 Report.” For a 
summary report, see Introduction to NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004). A succinct review of the 
failures that preceded 9/11, with a particular emphasis on intelligence failures is 
uded Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, 
 7, 2
e 127. 
s
incl  in the New York Times editorial. Editorial, Eight 
Jan. 010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/opinion/08fri1.html. 
128 See Editorial, Eight Years Later, supra not
129  However, it is appears that Abdulmutallab was a hadow of Mohammed 
Atta, the central 9/11 bomber, in his effectiveness. 
130  Mystery of CIA Bombers identity, BBC NEWS, Jan. 5, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8441292.stm. 
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was sufficiently well-known to Jordanian elites, to have a working 
relationship with the highest level of Jordanian intelligence, including 
 member of the Jordanian royal family.132  His radical tendencies 
ered 
igh-school exams and studied at the prestigious LSE.   As with the 
 
 
s the next section contends, it’s simply a matter of motivating the 
r S.   
 
a
were well known.133  
 
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the beheading of Wall Street Journal 
reporter, Daniel Pearl and a financial supporter of the 9/11 attacker 
Mohammed Atta, was from a rich Pakistani-British family.134 He 
studied at a prestigious British boarding school.135 Indeed, he 
represented Britain in the International Athletic World 
Championships, achieved top grades in the Cambridge-administ
136h
other subjects, the signs were there.137 Again, no one snitched.138  
 
The key is to provide incentives for persons with better information
and access to accomplish U.S. goals. The U.S. already does this in a
competent manner when critical foreign policy goals are at stake.  
A
ight people, namely, repeat-game players who need to visit the U.
d. Outsourced Diplomacy: Motivating the Right People 
 
On June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was exiled 
following an internal coup.  In the months subsequent to the coup, the 
U.S. repeatedly expressed the view that the coup was inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                                            
131  Adem Demir and Christopher Di , The Bomber’s Wife, NEWSWEEK, 
Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.newsweek.co
132  R. Jeffrey Smith, Joby Warwick and Ellen Naka
ckey
m/id/229792 
shima, CIA Bomber Struck 
 Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, 
annaford, The Toughest Boy in School, GUARDIAN UK, Feb. 23, 
n McGinty, The English Islamic Terrorist, SCOTSMAN, July 16, 
, 
Just Before
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/09/AR2010010900758.html. 
133  Id. 
134  Alex H
2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/23/alqaida.usa. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Stephe
2002 http://news.scotsman.com/kidnappingsiniraq/The-English-Islamic-
terrorist.2343711.jp. 
138  Id. 
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the constitutional obligations of the Honduran government.139  The 
U.S. refused to recognize the interim government, and encouraged the 
interim President Roberto Micheletti (and presumed coup-plotter) to 
come to the negotiating table.140  For months, the Micheletti 
administration refused to negotiate, and failed to respond to a series of 
.S. efforts to ratchet up the pressure, including the cancellations of 
licit message was 
lear. They should utilize their influence to bring their government to 
some shame among Honduran elites.144  These Honduran 
ns are quintessential “repeat game” players with the 
                                                  
U
the visas of government ministers.141   
 
Then suddenly, members of the Honduran business elite found that 
their visas had been revoked.142  Even a cursory network map 
confirms that the subjects of the visa-revocations were all 
businesspersons with close relationships to Micheletti.143 The 
revocations were targeted and strategic.  The imp
c
the negotiating table or face the prospect of having their visas revoked 
indefinitely.  
 
The visa revocations appear to have stung particularly hard, causing 
businessperso
         
eemed privately 
 
ds? 
e 
ness 
139  The best summary of the events surrounding the coup is included in 
William Finnegan, Letter from Honduras: “An Old-Fashioned Coup,” THE NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 30, 2009, at 38. 
140  Id. 
141  Id; see also William Finnegan, Gone South, NEW YORKER (Dec. 3, 2009),  
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/12/honduras-zelaya.html. 
142  Letter from Honduras, supra note 139; see also Gone South, supra note 
141. 
143  Letter from Honduras, supra note 139 (reporting that Honduras 
government is reportedly heavily influenced by ten business families, all of which 
appeared to be critics of Zelaya and, as such, implicit supporters of the coup). 
144  See Gone South, supra note 141 (“[T]he coup leaders s
stunned by the firmness of the American reaction . . . [t]hey seemed especially hurt
by the revocation of their U.S. visas.  This would not have happened if Republicans 
were still in power, they seemed to feel. After all, they had overthrown Zelaya partly 
in the name of anti-Communism . . . Did the U.S. no longer recognize its frien
The coup regime’s first foreign minister called Obama, in a TV interview, “that little 
black man who doesn’t know anything”—and that is a bland translation”), but se
Letter from Honduras, supra note 46 at 42 (in which a prominent Honduran busi
leader takes pains to make clear that his visa has not been revoked.) 
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U.S.145  Their businesses export to the U.S.146 They utilize U.S.-based 
correspondent banks.  Their children often study in the U.S.147 Given 
these extensive business and familial networks in the U.S., visa-
revocation effectively curtailed their ability to accomplish important 
personal and commercial objectives.  It could not have been lost on 
them that the U.S. had the ability to make their lives substantially 
more difficult if the Micheletti government did not negotiate.  Again 
using game theoretic analogies, individuals with a high degree of 
dependence on the U.S. have maximal incentives to comply with U.S. 
diplomatic objectives, since the costs of defection are obviously high.   
 Cuba.  That is, 
ey too had minimal incentives to counter the U.S.  
 
Indeed, the U.S. has utilized similar techniques to accomplish 
diplomatic goals with respect to Cuba.  For example, prestigious hotel 
chains were operating hotels on properties, which were the subject of 
legal proceedings following their expropriation from Cuban-
Americans by the Castro regime.148  Although the hotel chains were 
not parties to the legal proceedings and simply tenants on the 
properties now “owned” by the Cuban government, the U.S. revoked 
the visas of the hotels’ principals.149  The hoteliers quickly terminated 
their leases, thereby depriving the Cuban administration of needed 
lease revenue.150  Since these hoteliers were multinational chains that 
were heavily dependent on American tourists in other markets, they 
understood that their business model could have been greatly 
compromised if they continued to do business with
th
                                                           
145 This relationship calls to mind a classic iterated prisoners’ dilemma, in which the 
game is played repeatedly.   In contrast to a conventional prisoners’ dilemma, in 
which defection is always more beneficial than cooperation, in an iterated prisoners’ 
dilemma, which is played over several games, each player has an opportunity to 
sanction the other player for prior non-cooperative behavior.  Cooperation may arise 
as an equilibrium outcome since the incentive to defect may be outweighed by the 
threat of sanction. See JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME 
THEORY ch. 1 (2002) (providing a good summary for the nontechnical reader). 
146  See Letter from Honduras, supra at 139 (describing the business successes 
of elite Honduran families). 
147  Id. at 42 (describing how many rich Hondurans panicked in the chaotic 
aftermath of the coup, and sought to send their children to the U.S.) 
148  Jamaica Superclubs Exits Cuba after U.S.Threats, BNET (Cuba News), 
July 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5140/is_7_12/ai_n29102993/. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
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In Honduras, the U.S. succeeded.  In Cuba, the U.S. did not (although 
 did accomplish the more modest goal of depriving the Cuban 
was a direct and non-nebulous 
onnection between the goal in question and the visa holders in 
s, the central lesson of outsourced 
iplomacy is still germane to the challenge of identifying which elites 
with U.S. visas m care what 
eir peers think about them.  Visas not only facilitate travel, they are 
                                                           
it
administration of needed revenue).  Honduras came to the bargaining 
table quickly.  The process was undoubtedly accelerated by the 
intervention of businesspersons who had better information about their 
government than the U.S. and were better placed to apply pressure to 
their President.  The U.S. effectively “contracted out” their diplomatic 
functions.  
 
Admittedly, there are clear differences between the Cuban and 
Honduran instances of “outsourced diplomacy” and this proposal.  In 
both the Cuban and Honduran cases, the target group was small.  The 
threat of visa revocations pressured specific visa holders to take a 
specific action.  That is, there 
c
question.  Additionally, even though this Essay’s proposal is focused 
on a relatively small group of elites who inhabit the apices of their 
societies, it clearly involves a much broader target group (i.e., 
associates of as-yet-unidentified elites who may carry out terrorist 
acts).  Thus, the connection between the target group and the desired 
outcome is clearly more tenuous.   
 
Notwithstanding these difference
d
ay carry out a terrorist attack.  Individuals 
th
status conveyers, and visa denial may undermine the status of the 
person who loses her visa.151 Thus, persons can be influenced to 
achieve U.S. goals by the strategic allocation and denial of visas.  This 
is the subject of the next section. 
 
151  Indeed, this view was expressed by John Campbell, Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Nigeria and Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at 
the Council on Foreign Relations with respect to members of the Nigerian elite. See 
testimony of John Campbell at a recorded hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Feb. 23, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201002240888.html 
(last visited January 10, 2011) (“The power of the U.S. government to revoke 
visitors' visas is particularly potent personal leverage with members of the Nigerian 
elite.”). 
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e. The Screening and Sanctioning Principles 
 
The U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening elite 
aliens utilizing poor information.  Consular officers may have the 
standard information: curriculum vitae, bank records, professional 
affiliations, university diplomas.  However, consular officers lack the 
nuanced information needed to read between the lines.  For example, 
why was Abdulmutallab often missing classes at university?  Given 
his strong academic performance, there would be nothing in his paper 
ail to indicate that he missed classes to frequent mosques that were 
t, the 
formation utilized to process visa applications is what I would term 
are generally better information collectors than the U.S. government.  
eed, this is precisely why Congress 
ted
tr
known for radicalism.152  And why did he drop out of the elite 
business program in Dubai?153 Did he remain in Dubai or did he travel 
to Yemen?  With the benefit of a few conversations with classmates 
and friends, the authorities would potentially have had access to 
credible information about his unusual behavior, even after they 
granted his visa.   
 
Herein lies the paradox.  Although terrorist groups are typically 
difficult for Westerners to penetrate, the same cannot be said of elite 
networks.  Indeed, popular networking websites for elites such as “A 
Small World” are dedicated precisely to this idea.154  Ye
in
“insufficiently networked.”  It is garnered with little reference to the 
networks in which aliens typically occupy, including networks of 
family, friends, high school classmates, university peers, business 
associates and tribal members.  This is even as these network members 
After all, they are “on the ground” with the persons in question. 
 
There is precedent for creating incentives for associates of would-be 
terrorists to share information.  Ind
crea  the S visa, which provides long-term visas to those who offer 
                                                           
152  For a description of the dangers of extreme Islamic student societies, which 
n ser
 
e non-
ofte ve as a gateway to radicalism, see Venetia Thompson, supra note 120. 
153  Profile of Abdulmutallab, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8431530.stm. 
154  A SMALL WORLD, www.asmallworld.net (“a small world is a private 
community of internationally minded people from around the world” typically 
featuring stories about elites in business, education, government, th
governmental sector and cultural from all five continents). 
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valuable intelligence information. 155   But the S visa is not well-
targeted to elites and it is elite cooperation that is essential.  Given 
their privileged status in their own countries and their generally easy 
access to U.S. visa privileges, they are less likely than others to be 
attracted by the prospect of an S visa authorizing a long-term U.S. 
stay. Elites need a different kind of incentive.  The U.S. has to threaten 
 take away something that they value.   to
 
Herein enters the power of association.  Although the idea of social 
networks appears to be a modern concept, human beings have always 
                                                           
155 One might wonder why this essay argues for a penalty rather than a positive 
incentive to encouraging informing.  Such a positive incentive already exists.  Thus, 
d 
nt. 
 
 
o 
or 
 
it is worth distinguishing this proposal from the S visa. This visa is awarded to 
persons who provide invaluable information to the U.S. government. The proposal in 
this essay is completely different, namely, a disincentive for not snitching rather than 
a reward for snitching (which is what the S visa provides). See LEGOMSKY & 
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 830-31 (2009).  ("INA 101(a)(15)(S) authorizes 
nonimmigrant visas for certain individuals who are willing to share or have share
‘critical reliable information" about either a general criminal organization (so-called 
S5s) or a "terrorist organization’ (so-called S-6s).  . . . . Although the S-category had 
been a temporary program and had expired just two days after the September 11 
attacks, Congress soon thereafter passed legislation to make the program permane
 Pub. L. 107-45, 115 Stat. 258 (Oct. 1, 2001).  On Nov. 29, 2001, Att'y General 
Ashcroft wrote a memo launching the "Responsible Cooperators Program," in which
he officially encouraged various Justice Department personnel to make liberal use of
S-visas in "appropriate cases."  In those instances in which a person who is willing t
share important terrorism-related information is ineligible for an S-visa, the Att'y 
General urged the officials to consider parole or deferred action as an incentive f
cooperation.   See 78 IR at 1816-17 (Dec. 3, 2001).”) There are also other visas that 
incentivize “snitching” including the following: the U and T visas. For a discussion
of the U visa see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 411 ("The U-visas are 
for those who have 'suffered substantial physical or mental abuse' as the result of  . . .  
rape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, prostitution, 
female genital mutilation, involuntary servitude, abduction, felonious assault, and 
several other criminal acts.  The person must possess information concerning that 
criminal activity and must help law enforcement officials to investigate or prosecute. 
 INA § 101(a)(15)(U).”) For a discussion of the T visa See LEGOMSKY & 
ROD EZ, supra note 2 at 411 (“T visas are for victims of a 'severe form of RIGU
trafficking in persons' who are physically present in the United States or a port of 
entry as a result of that trafficking.  If age 18 or over, the person must comply with 
any reasonable request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of the 
trafficking.  INA § 101(a)(5)(T)”) 
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been social creatures; we live, work and play in groups.156  This basic 
intuition underlies much of modern life.  Facebook’s extraordinary 
uccess is simply a manifestation of this intuition.157  And yet, 
e terrorist threats.  The sanctioning 
component contends that astute officials can utilize soft rules, which 
tes admitted 
at although they found his behavior troubling, they had not raised an 
alarm sinc dence that he 
had already been screened by competent authorities. Under this 
s
although this seems obvious, we have failed to take account of this 
intuition in how we grant and revoke visas to enhance national 
security.   
 
The “visa to snitch” proposal is based on two major arguments, which 
will be succinctly referred to as the information-screening component 
and the sanctioning component.  The information screening 
component argues that network members who are proximate to visa 
recipients may be motivated to share with officials inside information 
as to which persons are likely to b
leverage the ties within networks to send signals to network members 
about the costs associated with not sharing information that may be 
relevant to terrorist investigations. 
 
The information-screening component contends that the U.S. should 
motivate network members to aid in both ex ante and ex post 
screening.  That is, network members should be incentivized to share 
information in the initial screening process, that is, before visas are 
issued.  But as importantly, they should also be provided with 
incentives to share such information even after visa issuance.  Thus, 
an elite visa-recipient would be sanctioned essentially for failing to 
report evidence of the transgressions of his peers even if these 
transgressions occurred after the person had already received a visa. 
Why is this important? Some of Abdulmutallab’s associa
th
e they took his student visa to constitute evi
proposal, excuses such as these would not be acceptable.  
 
f. What’s the Appropriate Sanction? 
                                                           
156  Granovetter’s landmark work popularized this concept.  Mark Granovetter, 
The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF SOC 1360 (1983). 
157  Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Facebook’s Valuation: By the Numbers, W. 
ST. J., Jan 3, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/01/03/facebooks-valuation-by-
the-numbers/. 
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Of course a “duty to snitch” must necessarily be accompanied by a 
anction. Under “a visa to snitch,” the U.S. would penalize network 
 
ystems, where community members are sanctioned for the sins of 
individual transgressions and, thus raise significant justice concerns.   
                                                           
s
members by revoking their visas (or at a minimum reducing the 
likelihood of visa renewal), if they cannot account for their failure to 
share pertinent information about a network member’s terrorist 
sympathies that it appears that they had reason to know.    If not as a 
de jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have 
access to immigration privileges that are not normally available to 
their fellow nationals.158  In exchange for this privilege, recipients of 
elite visa access should understand that there are implicit duties. 
 
This proposal has clear resemblances to collective sanctioning
s
their communal peers. Historically collective sanctions have been 
employed effectively to improve compliance in a variety of informal 
arenas in which formal structures for the collection of information 
were either not present or insufficient.159  Although such resemblances 
are thin as opposed to thick, this point should be conceded.  Collective 
sanctioning systems have generally been criticized for failing to abide 
by the principle that individual wrongdoers should pay for their 
158  The support for this claim with respect to Nigerian nationals is included in 
footnote 110. 
159   Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 (2003).  
Daryl Levinson provides a brief overview of the utilization of collective sanctions 
both historically and in modern times, with an emphasis on functional rationales for 
collective sanctioning, emphasizing that central features of modern legal systems, 
including vicarious, joint and several, and corporate liability, are justified utilizing 
similar functional rationales.  See also, Alan O. Sykes, Vicarious Liability, 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 673-77 (1998) and 
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, 3 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW at 71.  For a further 
discussion in the law review literature of the moral and functional justifications for 
collective sanctions, see also Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and 
Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 85, 89–
90 (1995). 
 Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive 
discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning.  For example, 
economic historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial 
revolution in late medieval times by allowing long-distance commercial exchange 
between parties who had no prior knowledge of each other. See Avner Greif, 
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:  The Maghribi 
Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and 
Coalitions in Medieval Trade:  Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 
857 (1989).   
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Thus, the question of the appropriateness of the penalty is delicate, 
articularly given that the signs of terrorist sympathies are often 
ied First Amendment protection as “radicals.”  Anti-
ietnam student groups were investigated precisely because they were 
n. 
n 
lance 
 not 
necessarily signify a tendency to violence (although an Islamist 
p
nebulous.  Hence, the sanctioning principle emphasizes that sanctions 
should be “soft.”  In so doing, I contrast it with sanctions that are 
typically experienced as “hard.”  For example, the U.S. decision to 
subject all Nigerian travelers to significantly increased scrutiny 
(following Abdulmutallab’s bomb attempt) was understood by 
Nigerians as an affront to their national dignity and arguably qualifies 
as a “hard” sanction.160  
 
It bears emphasis: signs of terrorist activity are often nebulous. Again, 
the case of the younger Mutallab is instructive.  Take for example, his 
leadership of a university Islamic society that has been called a 
“hotbed of radicalism.”161  With the benefit of hindsight commentators 
argued that this was a clear warning sign.162  However, it is not clear 
that this warning sign would have been evident to the average 
observer.  Indeed, given historical context, the very designation of 
Abdulmutallab’s membership in a student group as a “red flag” may 
cause our antennas to go up. During the McCarthy era, many students 
were den 163
V
perceived as “hotbeds of radicalism”164 by the Nixon administratio
Historians have subsequently judged such investigations to have bee
motivated by paranoia.165  Thus, there is a fine line between vigi
and paranoia.  Leadership of a controversial student group does
                                                           
160  Akunyulim, supra note 99. 
 
80 (1983) and D. CAUTE, THE GREAT 
 (19
ard Nixon was famously of this view. See CHARLES EDWARD 
WAR (2005). 
161  Thompson, supra note 120. 
162  Id. 
163   For a summary of First Amendment challenges to McCarthyism in 
universities see, E. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE 
UNIVERSITIES , Introduction at 1-25 (1986); see also D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED
CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-19
FEAR 78) (all discussing the targeting of “radical” students and professors by 
different federal and state investigations)   
164  Rich
STE T, INSIDE THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 138 
165  Id. 
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society is arguably of a different character than a Vietnam protest
group).   
 
Was his leadership of an Islamist student group relevant?
 
on 
ial 
arch on human judgment suggests that the 
pical subject has difficulty ignoring a known outcome when 
formation) should clearly 
ave an opportunity to explain herself.169 Moreover, a soft approach in 
compliance, but not so tough as to undermine precisely the 
166   Since 
several leaders of this particular student group have been indicted 
terrorism charges, it appears that the answer is yes.167 Should his 
friends have subsequently been accountable for failing to alert the 
authorities to his leadership of this group?  There is clearly a potent
issue of hindsight bias: rese
ty
assessing an event's likelihood.168 Moreover, there is also the issue of 
what behavior we may reasonably expect the average non-expert 
network member to consider suspicious. While Abdulmutallab’s 
leadership of an Islamist society might have appeared relevant to an 
expert eye, this might not have been clear to a reasonable (but non-
expert) network member.   
 
This is precisely why prior to visa-revocation, the visa-recipient (who 
is suspected of not having shared pertinent in
h
sanctioning is counseled by the fact that rather than simply imposing 
negative duties not to cause harm, the authorities would be imposing 
affirmative duties to prevent harm.  The aim is to impose a soft 
sanction, that is, a penalty that is sufficiently tough to deter non-
cooperation that one is trying to encourage.   
 
                                                           
166 Detroit Terror Attack, supra note 30.  
167  Id. 
168  For a good discussion of hindsight bias see, Kim A. Kamin & Jeff J. 
Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. 
AV. BEH 89 (1995) (discussing evidence of hindsight bias in diverse fora from jury to 
surgical decision-making). 
169  I should note that most visa-holders would not typically be entitled to due 
process. “… [A]n unusual provision in the INA 104(a) exempts individual visa 
determinations from the supervision and control of the Secretary of State.  [. . . ] 
 There is no procedure . . .  that permits the applicant to appeal a visa refusal to some 
higher administrative authority."  T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 651 (2008). 
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Indeed, the INA already allows the authorities discretion to deny visas 
to individuals who are believed to have weak connections to terrorist 
networks, without providing them any opportunity to disabuse 
authorities of such suspicions.170  This proposal appears more 
reasonable, in that persons will be given an opportunity to explain 
themselves.  The point is that there is an obvious line-drawing issue 
here, but it hardly different than the type of line-drawing issue that law 
enforcement officials regularly deal with in the course of many 
vestigations.  Given the inherently imprecise nature of terrorist 
 the applicant.  Savvy applicants would 
imply fail to list associates who might raise alarm.  Moreover, even in 
the absence of associates provided odern network 
analysis (the subject of the next se ent to 
generate its o
 
 
                                                           
in
sympathies, it will be incumbent on an official will take this into 
account in determining whether an associate of a suspect should 
reasonably have known or have reported her suspicions.   
 
Notably, visa applications do not typically ask applicants to list 
associates.  This is an interesting omission.  During the Cold War, 
U.S. visa applicants were regularly asked to name their affiliations 
with Communist persons.171  The point is not to ally this proposal with 
the misguided methods of the McCarthy era, but simply to point out 
that this omission in the visa application could easily be remedied.  In 
any event, it is unclear that the government would necessarily want to 
rely on references provided by
s
 by the applicant, m
ction) will allow the governm
wn network list. 
 weapons), explosives, or training . . .  for the commission of a terrorist 
activity” INA § 212 (a) (3) (B). See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 851 
for a discussion of the controversy surrounding this provision. 
171  See, e.g., John Scanlan, supra note 41 (discussing pre-emptive screening of 
visa-applicants for those with Communist affiliations); see also Application for 
Advance Permission to enter as a non-immigrant at www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-
192instr.pdf (“Do not file this form if you are a visa applicant who is inadmissible 
under INA section 212(a)(4)(including “communist or other totalitarian party 
member.”) 
170 See INA § 212 which declares that a person is not eligible for admission to 
the United States if they “commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should 
know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false 
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or 
radiological
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g. Why the Solution Can Work 
 
Given recent lessons from social network theory, 172 finding the right 
people to shed light on potentially problematic visa-applicants is 
entirely practical.  Although social network theory has only recently 
gained currency in the popular imagination as a consequence of the 
biquitousness of social networking sites, its insights are not new, 
recepts of sociology, 
nthropology, computer science and organizational behavior.  
We can
 
 
hom by what 
communication media . . . Because these relationships are not 
the incident, “the number (of Facebook friends) appeared to be falling 
u
drawing as they do from long-established p
a
 
 understand social network analysis as:  
map(ping) and measur(ing) formal and informal relationships 
to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows 
that bind interacting units, viz., who knows whom and who 
shares what information and knowledge with w
usually readily discernable, social network analysis is 
somewhat akin to an “organizational x-ray.” 173 
 
Network theory coupled with modern technology provides an easy 
mechanism of verifying which persons are members of a network.  
Again, Abdulmutallab is a case in question.  Notably, he had 287 
Facebook friends the day before his terrorist attack.174  Notably, after 
                                                           
172 Olivier Serrat, Social Network Analysis, KNOWLEDGE SOLUTIONS (a 
publication of the Asian Development Bank), Feb. 28, 2009, 
http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/TSE-portal/analysis/social-network-analysis/.(Social networks 
are defined as “[n]odes of individuals, groups, organizations, and related systems 
that tie in one or more types of interdependence: these include shared values, visions 
and ideas; social contacts, kinship, conflict; financial exchanges, trade, joint 
membership in organizations; and group participation in events, among numerous 
ial Network Analysis for Organizations, 4 THE 
. O
/r
 29, 2009,  
dian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/29/web-postings-umar-farouk-
ulmu b. 
other aspects of human relationships.”) 
173  NOEL TICHY ET AL., Soc
ACAD F MAN. REV., 507 (1979). 
174  Rich Tehrani, (Dec. 29, 2009), http://blog.tmcnet.com/blog ich-
tehrani/security/terrorist-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-a-social-networker.html. See 
also Adam Gabbatt, Web Postings of Abdulmutallab, GUARDIAN UK, Dec.
http://www.guar
abd talla
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fast.”175  The point is that people care about which networks they are 
perceived to be a part of.  Clearly, his Facebook friends did not want 
be perceived as part of his network.  However, ex post opportunistic 
electronic behavior could not eliminate the pre-existing electronic 
tracks.  From reports in the blogosphere, it appears likely that many of 
ese individuals have since been subject to questioning, whether they 
nformation from the 
ea of not-so-useful information. How is the U.S. government going to 
                                                           
th
“unfriended” Abdulmutallab or not.176  
 
However, there is the problem of information overload. Who precisely 
is elite?  The elite by definition are a group of relatively small size, 
occupying a position of privilege within a much larger society.  But 
the question remains: which elites precisely should be targeted?  There 
must be thousands (if not more cases) where persons exhibit troubling 
behaviors, which are unconnected to terrorist tendencies.  Verifying 
the information provided will increase the time and expense required 
to process visas, but without verification the process seems pro forma.  
It would be difficult to sort out the truly useful i
s
sort through this potential flood of information?   
 
I have resisted the inclination to identify, which particular categories 
of elites the proposal would apply to.  This question is best left to 
technical experts with national security expertise.  Even without the 
benefit of inside information, some mechanisms of classifying elites to 
reduce information overload are immediately apparent. 177    For 
example, elite terrorists appear to be disproportionately likely to have 
science and engineering backgrounds.  Similarly, elite terrorists seem 
to be disproportionately likely to come from particular regions of the 
world.  The authorities might impose the obligation to snitch only on 
elites from those regions, in the interest of mitigating the problems of 
information overload. However, this would feed into a perception that 
the obligation falls disproportionately on Muslims or those of Middle 
Eastern origin. In the interest of not alienating precisely those elites 
175 Id. 
176  Id. 
177  For example, in the Honduran context the persons who lost their visas were 
recipients of B 1 business visas, which enabled ease of targeting. The B-1 visa 
applies to non-citizens who are visiting the United States temporarily for business.  
See INA 101(A)(15)(v); 22 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (2006).   
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where cooperation is most needed, DHS might resist the tendency to 
categorize publicly, imposing the obligation on a much broader 
ategory of elites, even if they later focus on information provided by 
lites of particular nationalities. 
 
y did the elder Mutallab Snitch? 
 traded Nigerian firms.   
e was also particularly prominent in the Muslim community as the 
on Nigeria’s economic landscape as government official, banking 
                                                           
c
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III: Wh
 
Background 
 
A more detailed consideration of the elder Mutallab’s network is 
instructive.  Umarmutallab was a former Nigerian Cabinet Minister178   
and Chairman of one of Nigeria’s largest banks.179  He was a member 
of the Board of Directors of several publicly 180
H
primary patron of a well-known mosque.181  
 
Umarmutallab is described as someone “whose friends cut across 
states, religion and sex.”182  In the words of a Nigerian commentator, 
“the older Mutallab benefitted from his deft positioning across an 
immense network of family, geo-ethnic and professional layers of 
interests.  Consequently, the man has had a near permanent presence 
178  A summary of his biography is included in the leading weekly newspaper 
of the Hausa tribe in Nigeria, Idris Ahmed,  Mutallab, An Accomplished Banker, SUN 
DAILY TRUST, Dec. 27, 2009,  
http://www.sunday.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=2390:mutallab-an-accomplished-banker&catid=41:latest-news&Itemid=26. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  Chido Nwangwu, The Mutallabs: Terror-bound Son Farouk and Business 
Mogul Father Umar, USAAFRICAONLINE, Dec. 26, 2009, 
http://www.usafricaonline.com/mutallabs-chido-usafrica/.  See also Walker et al., 
supra note 32 (discussing the wealth of Umarmutallab), Rice, supra note 34 (noting 
that his father’s affluence upset Abdulmutallab) 
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investor, facilitator or shareholder –working the levers of power– all 
through civilian and military governments in Nigeria for more than 35 
ears.”183 
 
a. Rational Motives 
 honor, tactically, he took several steps to achieve his broader 
oals.  
g that 
nyone else who offered support would incur his disapproval.   
ling his son’s travel 
verseas and arranging his return to Nigeria.187   
                                 
y
 
With the benefit of hindsight, Umarmutallab’s behavior appears to 
have been well thought out and highly planned.  Irrespective of 
whether his larger strategic goals might have been to save his son’s 
life, maintain his mobility, protect his financial assets, or preserve his 
familial
g
 
Firstly, he utilized his private networks to signal disapproval of his 
son’s behavior.  For example, the elder Mutallab withdrew financial 
support from his son.184  He did not hide this information; he shared 
his decision with family and close associates.185  In so doing, he made 
clear to his private networks that he disapproved of Abdulmutallab’s 
decision to relocate to Yemen while implicitly communicatin
a
 
But notably, the elder Mutallab moved beyond these quintessentially 
private actions taken in private networks.  Importantly, he took the 
much larger step of signifying his disapproval to the public authorities 
by snitching.  He met with the Nigerian security officials at the highest 
levels.186  He sought their assistance in curtai
o
 
Thirdly, through Nigerian security officials, Umarmutallab arranged 
meetings with their American counterparts.  He met with Embassy 
officials repeatedly, providing evidence of his son’s increasing 
radicalism including details of his travel to Yemen.188  He expressed 
particular concern that his son indicated in a telephone call that he did 
                          
supra note 31. 
183  Id. 
184 Id. 
185  Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Nossiter, 
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not expect to see his family again.189 Furthermore, the elder Mutallab 
reportedly met with a senior officer at the CIA.190  Through all these 
efforts, Umarmutallab indicated very clearly whose side he was on.  
Not only was he not providing support to a terrorist network, he also 
nderlined that he was willing to help disrupt it.  
 it helps us to provide incentives for similar behavior in the 
ture.     
n a pre-
mptive mechanism of protecting his mobility and his assets. 
                                                           
u
 
Why did Umarmutallab snitch?  Although commentators emphasized 
the heart-wrenching nature of the father’s decision to report his child 
to the authorities, the emotional nature of the decision does not 
preclude strategic behavior.  Speculation as to the father’s motives in 
subsequent analyses has been rife.  Motives are notoriously difficult to 
ascertain.  Indeed, two millennia after Judas Ischariot snitched to the 
Romans,191 we are still speculating about what made him do it!  Yet in 
this instance ascertaining potential motives may be fruitful to the 
extent that
fu
 
Some may have a rather cynical view of Umarmutallab’s actions.  As 
a very wealthy man with assets in many countries, he could hardly 
afford for these assets to be frozen simply because of the wayward 
actions of his son.  As one relative noted, “[t]his is somebody who has 
investments in the Western world since before the boy was born . . . 
[h]e’s got a £4 million house in London.  Now the boy is jeopardizing 
everything.”192  Moreover, he was necessarily dependent on global 
mobility to conduct his business.  Snitching may have bee
e
 
On this view, one could posit what might be broadly characterized as 
rational choice or welfarist accounts of Umarmutallab’s behavior.  
Simply put, on this account, Umarmutallab is a rational utility 
maximizer who has decided that he is most likely to maximize his 
welfare by snitching on his son.  That is, when faced with the prospect 
of visa revocation and the potential freezing of his assets if the 
authorities suspected that he had provided financial support for his 
son’s attempted terrorist attack, he decided that he was simply better 
189 Id. 
190  Nwangwu, supra note 183. 
191  Matthew 27:3-8 (King James Bible).   
192  Nossiter, supra note 31. 
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off reporting his son.  (It is precisely such a view that is reflected in 
 
he future consequences of non-cooperative behavior may give him 
ey have to the U.S., the repeated nature of their 
teractions with the U.S. increases the likelihood that they will share 
ich 
rovide her Western market access and she does not perceive these 
visas to be at risk, she may be willing to put her U.S. visa at risk.   
                                                           
the quotation from a relative in the preceding paragraph.) 
 
The larger point is that it is helpful to view his behavior through a 
game theoretic lens.  That is, like the aforementioned Honduran 
businesspersons, as a wealthy international banker, the elder Mutallab 
may be conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat-game 
arrangements with overseas actors.  For example, if Umarmutallab 
engages in transnational banking transactions, with intermediary U.S.-
based banks, these repeat-game arrangements are necessarily 
contingent on the cooperation of the U.S. government.  Indeed, 
Umarmutallab may be quite reasonably conceptualized as engaging in 
a series of repeat game arrangements with the U.S. government itself. 
T
good reason to pre-emptively snitch.  
 
There is a broader point here.  Can the U.S. expect network members 
to reliably meet their informational sharing function?  Utilizing game 
theoretic analogies, this Essay contends that the answer will generally 
be yes.  In a competitive globalized context in which elites value the 
access that th
in
information.  
 
Yet, this recommendation is not dependent on whether elites 
"generally" snitch rather than risk withdrawal of their visa privileges.  
Using the previous game-theoretic analyses, if a player does not 
perceive that she will suffer in the long-term from non-cooperative 
behavior with the U.S., she may well defect early in the “game.” 
Perhaps her U.S. visa is not particularly valuable, particularly if she 
does not believe that U.S. visa revocation will trigger other Western 
countries to revoke her other visas.193 Thus, if a potential snitch has 
other valuable visas (such as visas to Canada or the E.U.) wh
p
193  That is, a potential snitch may not believe that Western governments would 
act cooperatively and collectively revoke her visas. Indeed, this would not be an 
unreasonable perception since even after the British immigration authorities denied 
Abdulmutallab’s visa application, other countries including the U.S. did not revoke 
his visa.   
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Moreover, there are many reasons that she might hesitate to snitch.  
She might feel there is not really enough evidence to justify her 
suspicions.  Moreover, she might fear that the U.S. itself will act 
uncooperatively by failing to keep her cooperation confidential. In so 
doing undermine, the U.S. would undermine her status in the group or 
even provoke her expulsion from the group. She might also have 
concerns about the personal safety of family members in her home 
country who are not able to travel and as such may be quintessential 
“hostages.”194  Furthermore, even if the consequences are not so 
extreme, she might be concerned that community members will 
question her motives.  Rather than being perceived as honorable, she 
might be branded as a U.S. lackey.  Moreover, she might remain silent 
out of a belief that the U.S. government is very unlikely to discover 
that she had this information.  Thus the case does not rest on an 
acceptance of the prediction that elites will "generally" snitch.  It 
should be enough to posit that elites will snitch in some significant 
number of cases.  Whatever that number is, the benefit of this proposal 
to the U.S. national interest is considerable, given the terrible potential 
ll of even a single terrorist act. 
 
b. Norms-based Motives 
 
meone who brings shame to his family, to others or 
 his country.’195 
                                                           
to
 
 
 
Word is, on the streets in Nigeria and abroad, that the name 
‘Mutallab’ is now a bonafide word in the English dictionary!  As a 
noun, it means ’so
to
 
Traditional deterrence theory posits a relationship between the 
perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions and the likelihood 
that a rational individual will abide by a rule.  Conceptualizing man as 
a rational calculator of potential costs and rewards from potential acts, 
194  See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments:  Using Hostages to 
Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–40 (1983).   
195  From a popular Nigerian diaspora blogger, “Tochi”; Tochi, In Spite of 
Mutallab I Am Still Here, AND TOCHI SAYS…  WHOSE THOUGHTS ARE YOU 
THINKING, (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.tochi.us/blog/?p=1572 .  
51 
 
legal sanctions are viewed as a cost that would accompany a potential 
illegal act.  Given this view of “rational man,” we should mandate 
information sharing and enforce tough penalties to motivate network 
members who suspect terrorist activities to share information.  Yet, 
there is an alternative view.  In norm-driven cultures, shame is a 
primary mechanism of social control and may be utilized to motivate 
persons to share critical information with the government.  Indeed, a 
less traditional view of effective deterrents (namely successful 
disincentives to anti-social behavior) is based primarily on this view of 
ocial control. 
the 
ithdrawal of esteem is an effective mechanism of sanctioning.197 
very 
ehavior that the U.S. is seeking to deter is instead celebrated.199 
 
                                                           
s
 
For example, the sociologist Dennis Wrong decried the 
disproportionate focus on formal sanctions in traditional theories of 
deterrence and contended that informal sanctions in the form of social 
disapproval were potentially as effective deterrents, since man is 
“especially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self 
by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others.” 196  Since 
Wrong’s landmark paper, considerable empirical evidence has 
emerged from the behavioral sciences to support the notion that 
w
 
Wrong’s supplement to traditional deterrence theory proves relevant to 
theories of normative deterrence such as the one posited here.  Of 
course, communal norms do not always reinforce U.S. law 
enforcement goals.  For example, some communities appear to 
celebrate suicide bombing as a legitimate means of political 
statement.198  It would be difficult to stimulate community members to 
withdraw esteem as an effective method of sanctioning if the 
b
196  Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Men in Modern 
Sociology, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 183 (1961).  
197  For a summary of such studies, see, e.g., Donna Bishop, Legal and Extra-
legal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 403 (1984).  For 
a summary of more recent work, see HERBERT JACOB, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 69 (2004). 
198  See, e.g., ADAM L. SILVERMAN, Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A 
Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence, 44 J. 
OF CHURCH AND ST. 73 (2002). 
199  Id. 
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However, this is unlikely to be true of elite communities, which the 
sociological literature tells us generally share an inclination to avoid 
unwelcome attention.200  Indeed, although official sanctioning might 
play some role in the individual decision-making matrices of 
Umarmutallab, a potentially more relevant factor is that his elite 
community perceives terrorist violations to be unattractive because 
they draw unwanted attention to the community.  Under a social 
deterrence framework, Umarmutallab’s action may be viewed against 
the background of such an elite culture, which prioritizes shame 
avoidance and honor restoration.201  
  
Given this background context, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the 
Nigerian blogosphere, the younger Mutallab’s actions were widely 
perceived as bringing shame not only to the family, but also to the 
nation.  One blogger on a popular Nigerian diaspora blog decried the 
failure of Nigerian elites to defend their country’s name publicly in the 
face of the Obama administration’s decision to put Nigeria on a “high 
risk” terror list,202 declaring, “the Mutallab effect seems to be shutting 
us all up.  The shame is collectively shared.  The collateral damage is 
resulting in embarrassment and self-doubt.”203  As if to extirpate such 
shame, a headline in a major Nigerian newspaper appropriated the 
words of a Nigerian Minister to capture the sentiments of the entire 
country: “[h]e is not one of us.”204  
 
                                                           
200  BOTTOMORE, supra note 14. 
201  Indeed, precisely this point is captured in two classic works of literature 
from Nigeria which share similar themes: the Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka’s Death 
and the King’s Horsemen and the Nobel nominee Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall 
Apart.  Death and the King’s Horsemen is inspired by a famous incident in Nigerian 
colonial history. See Bernth Lindfors, A Last Shot at the Twentieth Century Canon in 
ERNEST EMENYONU, NEW DIRECTIONS IN AFRICAN LITERATURE (2006) (noting that 
in both Soyinka and Achebe’s texts, the protagonists go to great lengths to extirpate 
shame and restore family honor, even by committing ritual suicide).  
202  Micheline Maynard and Liz Robbins, New Restrictions Quickly Added for 
Air Passengers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/us/27security.html. 
203 See Reuben Abati, (Jan. 3, 2010 05:01 EST), 
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/reuben-abati/mutallab-we-are-guilty-
by-association.html. 
204 Akunyulim, supra note 99. 
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A noble view of the older Mutallab’s motives highlights the potential 
disgrace to the family name that would, and did, result from his son’s 
actions.  In anticipation of the monumental blow to the family’s honor, 
the father’s decision to snitch might be viewed as a pre-emptive 
attempt to restore honor.  While the son has sullied the family and the 
nation, the elder Mutallab’s actions have been perceived as a valiant 
attempt to restore the dignity of his family and the broader Nigerian 
society. 
 
It bears emphasizing that these constructs are not peculiar to Nigeria, 
and, as such, the broader insight has larger applicability.  Shame has 
been a historical mechanism of sanctioning in a wide range of cultures 
from the Hebrew nation, to indigenous tribal groups on all five 
continents.205  Even biblical prophets were subject to shame when they 
transgressed widely understood social rules.206  The Israelite King 
David was shamed repeatedly for committing adultery in violation of 
biblical laws, despite his elevated status.  David’s narrative is simply a 
biblical antecedent to that of the Mutallab family;207 many societies 
have their own Davids.  Communal shame-based sanctioning has a 
long heritage (and surely a longer heritage than law-based 
sanctioning!).208  Although much has been made of the decline of 
shame as an effective mechanism of sanctioning in modern society, in 
                                                           
205  Two such classic texts are MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: 
ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 20 (1968) and E. 
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 232 (1954). 
206  The following text in Jeremiah is understood to be a warning to prophets 
who would transgress social rules Jeremiah, 8:9  (King James Bible) ("The wise men 
are put to shame, They are dismayed and caught; Behold, they have rejected the 
word of the Lord, And what kind of wisdom do they have?). 
207  The narrative of David’s transgression and punishment by God, including 
public shaming, are contained in the Old Testament at 2 Samuel 11-12 (King James 
Bible).  
208  McAdams makes this point forcefully.  See Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-75 
(1997).   The point is discussed in all of the following texts, which discuss individual 
shaming, particularly as a mechanism of mitigating collective shame.  COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY (LARRY MAY & STACEY HOFFMAN EDS., 1991); PETER A. FRENCH, 
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, 
COMPLICITY (2000); LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY (1992); LARRY MAY, 
THE MORALITY OF GROUPS (1987); Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. 
PHIL. 674 (1968). 
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many societies, shaming is still an effective mechanism of social 
control.209  
 
 
 
 
c. What are the Implications of a Norms-based Analysis? 
 
 
Given this background recognition of a shame-based approach to 
motivating compliance with legal rules, the U.S. government may be 
better served by a soft, as opposed to a heavy-handed approach.  
Hence, the focus on visa-revocation.  The revocation of such a 
privilege, which is typically done privately by the State Department 
(and as such, is not a matter of the public record), is a quintessential 
“soft” approach.   
 
By articulating a duty to snitch and reinforcing extant communal 
norms in a subtle as opposed to heavy-handed manner, the U.S. 
government will potentially reduce the likelihood that network 
members will fence-sit.  The aim is for the government to motivate 
network members to signal clearly which side of the fence they fall on.  
In so doing, they may even motivate network members to withdraw 
esteem from any other network member who had reason to know 
valuable information and failed to snitch.   
 
A final point may be in order.  The emphasis on norms/communal 
based sanctioning derives in part from an appreciation of the clear 
differences between the manner in which the state functions in less-
developed states such as Nigeria and the traditional understanding of 
state function in the Anglo-American legal tradition.  In many 
developing countries, the state is not a reliable provider of public 
goods; it is functionally irrelevant.210  Rather, the individual will rely 
                                                           
209  McAdams has a good summary of the continued prevalence of shame 
based sanctioning systems, supra note 208.  Indeed, modern Chinese shopkeepers in 
New York regularly post the names and pictures of shoplifting suspects as a 
deterrent to future shop lifters. Corey Kilgannon and Jeffrey Singer, Shoplifting 
Suspects Choice: Pay or Be Shamed, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 2010, at A1. 
210  This point is made particularly well in the literature in context of post-
conflict societies. See e.g. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitution Drafting in Post-
55 
 
on extended tribal and familial ties for the protection of life, liberty, 
and property, and even “public goods” (e.g. roads, public utilities etc.) 
will often be provided through extended tribal and familial networks.  
In such a context, it becomes particularly important to leverage extant 
tribal/communal based norms.  Thus, a duty to snitch may be 
perceived as an attempt to “nudge” the elder Mutallab off the 
proverbial fence to report behavior that is already in violation of 
communal-based norms.211   
 
 
Part IV: The Dangers 
 
I now turn to discussing a few of the elephants in the room.  First, 
there are concerns about the dangers of alienating sub-sections of 
society that are critical to law-enforcement efforts by placing 
affirmative obligations upon them that are not perceived to apply more 
broadly to other sections of the society.  Second, there is a concern 
regarding the McCarthyite implications of imposing a duty to 
snitch.212  Third, there is a concern regarding the dangers of corruption 
of the process more generally. Moreover, there may be major due 
process and equal protection concerns among immigrants and Muslim-
Americans. 213  If these concerns are left unaddressed, Muslim 
                                                                                                                                            
Conflict States Symposium: Conciliatory Institutions And Constitutional Processes 
In Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1213 (2008); Paul Richards, 
War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 41 (2001); Jamie 
O’Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support 
Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 207 (2004). 
211  The utilization of the term “nudge” here is a play on the utilization of the 
term in RICHARD THALER AND CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).  The book draws on research in 
psychology and behavioral economics to defend libertarian paternalism and active 
engineering of choice architecture. 
212  Although the policy proposal undoubtedly raises some of the concerns of 
this earlier era, First Amendment challenges to perceived exclusion on the basis of 
certain ideological commitments (or even more tenuously association with those 
bearing certain ideological commitments, since this proposal specifically targets 
“associates”) are unlikely to be successful. See infra note 241 and accompanying 
text. 
213  Although this is undoubtedly a serious concern, it bears emphasizing that 
this is not a primary topic of this paper. Indeed, this has been dealt with ably 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and 
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American advocacy groups have argued that such perceived targeting 
of communities will undermine intelligence sharing.214 
 
Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement, 
Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative 
duties (i.e. to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not 
to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society.  Malcolm X 
argued that the imposition of such obligations on blacks and black 
Muslims in particular (even implicitly) threatened to alienate precisely 
those portions of the population whose cooperation is critical to law 
enforcement efforts.  
 
The applicability of this critique to this proposal is obvious.  Indeed, 
among public intellectuals, there has been considerable disquiet about 
the distinction between “moderate” and “other” Muslims.215  There 
also appears to be an implicit obligation that seems to attach to 
Muslims to display their moderate bona fides.216  To the extent that 
this proposal is formulated specifically in response to Al Qaeda’s 
penetration of Muslim elites, and might appear to disproportionately 
impact Muslim elites, critics might reasonably argue that obligations 
are yet again, attaching to Muslims to prove their “moderation” in a 
manner that is not expected of non-Muslims.  Such actions potentially 
undermine faith in law enforcement.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling after September 11, 34 CONN. 
L. REV. 1185 (2002). See also, Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1575 (2002); Susan Akram & Kevin Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and 
Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Muslims and Arabs, 
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); Marie A. Taylor, Immigration 
Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-
American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 72-85 (2002); 
Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration 
Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173 (2004); Samuel Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial 
Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002). Several of the 
articles in footnote 69 also discuss this concern.  
214  See Footnote 43 for references containing a discussion of these concerns. 
215  The debate between Daniel Larison and Ross Douhat on the New York 
Times blog epitomizes the concern regarding this distinction. See Ross Douthat, 
More on Rauf and Moderate Islam Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/more-on-rauf-and-moderate-islam/. 
216   Id. 
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Moreover, Natapoff217 has written convincingly of the dangers that an 
excessive reliance on snitching will undermine faith in law 
enforcement in the context of another community, namely poor 
African-American urban communities:  
 
The policy (of disproportionate reliance on snitching) 
presupposes a community filled with criminals that need to be 
infiltrated in order to be saved.  It is a community with reduced 
privacy interests in which it is permissible for the state to use 
informants to penetrate the most private zones in pursuit of 
prosecutorial goals.  It is, in essence, a community with 
lessened dignitary interests in the eyes of the state . . . (a 
community that), is treated as having relinquished some of the 
basic rights to privacy and to be let alone.218  
 
Some of these concerns are unavoidable.  Nevertheless, they can be 
mitigated.  Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I have taken pains 
to emphasize the “soft” nature of the sanctioning for non-compliant 
persons.  Notably, the Department of Justice has been criticized for 
what has been characterized as prosecutorial overreaching in relation 
to the communities of terrorist suspects.219  The concern is that law 
enforcement targets community members even when they play no role 
in attacks, for unrelated and relatively minor immigration 
transgressions, thus undermining the likelihood that communities will 
share intelligence with the authorities.220  Moreover, these 
communities are now transnational.221 If an immigrant is deported for 
                                                           
217  Natapoff, supra note 38.  
218  Id. at 695. 
219  See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 214 at 1193 (“the DOJ, working on less-than 
credible tips, has effectively disrupted individual lives, families, and communities”). 
220  Id. 
221  The transnational nature of the alien population is a major theme in the 
sociological literature, but the law review literature generally appears not to have 
incorporated this insight.  For a summary of the transnationalism research, see Peggy 
Levitt, Salsa and Ketchup:  Transnational Migrants Straddle Two Worlds, in THE 
CONTEXTS READER, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Jeff Goodwin & 
James Jasper eds., 2008).    The sociology literature generally refers to transnational 
persons as migrants who maintain strong connections to their countries of origin. 
The only person who seems to have incorporated this insight in the legal scholarship 
is Kim Barry. See Kim Barry, Home and Away:  The Construction of Citizenship in 
an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006). 
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a minor immigration infraction, she will take the animosity she feels 
towards the U.S. back to her community and country of origin, thereby 
undermining the likelihood that her broader circle of family and 
friends will cooperate with the U.S.  
 
This point is particularly relevant in light of the earlier point about the 
distinction between the manner in which the state has traditionally 
been conceptualized in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and the 
limited utility of the state in developing countries such as Nigeria. If 
developing countries are not well-placed to be reliable intelligence 
partners,222 it is especially important to keep the communities within 
these countries on the side of the U.S. Hence, the necessity for a more 
flexible approach to sanctioning that allows one to leverage these 
communal ties. 
 
a. The Dangers of the Imposition of an Affirmative Duty More 
Generally 
 
 
The critique is augmented by the proposal’s imposition of affirmative 
duties as opposed to the traditional negative duties on elites.  In the 
traditional liberal philosophical conception of moral personhood, all 
persons are moral agents who have varying moral duties.  Yet not all 
duties are created equal.  That is, there is a moral and conceptual 
distinction between affirmative and negative duties.  223 
 
Negative duties restrict actions; they set limits of behaviors that we 
may not pursue without infringing on the rights of others.224  Negative 
duties follow from liberalism’s prioritization of individual autonomy 
and rights.  On a traditional conception of negative moral duties, it 
would be understandable if visa-recipients have a duty not to harm. 
This proposal however, goes further.  Not only do visa-recipients have 
                                                           
222  This may be the case even if the state is well-intentioned; its unreliability 
may simply due to its limited reach. Indeed, this point is made particularly well in a 
New York Times article on Nigeria’s intelligence failures. Adam Nossiter, Security 
Flaws in Nigeria Are Now Drawing Notice, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A10. 
223 An accessible summary of the difference between the two types of duties is 
H.M. Malm, Directions of Justification in the Negative-Positive Duty Debate, 27 
AM. PHIL QUARTERLY 315 (Oct. 1990). 
224 Id. 
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a duty not to harm, they have a duty to share such information to 
prevent such harm, to the extent that information, which may prevent 
terrorist threats is accessible to them.  They have an affirmative duty 
to take action.  Such a duty is bound to be more controversial, because 
it arises from an affirmative conception of human obligation.  
Although positive duties are more likely understood to hold generally 
(that is, we have a general duty to help others), how we fulfill that duty 
is typically left up to us.225  In this proposal, an obligation is imposed 
on the individual to help the authorities.  The individual appears to 
have little say in the matter.   
 
The imposition of affirmative duties is a logical extension of an 
emerging consensus (certainly post 9/11) that we have affirmative 
obligations to prevent terrorist attacks.  We are all familiar with the 
injunctions in airports and train stations to report strange behaviors, 
strange bags etc.  Typically, for American nationals, there are rarely 
legal consequences for a failure to report suspicious activity.   
 
However, the same cannot be said for non-citizens.  For example, at 
least one friend of the would-be Times Square bomber, Shahzad was 
deported for a minor visa infraction although he was never charged 
and no evidence was presented publicly that he had specific 
knowledge of Shahzad’s nefarious activities. 226  The reason for the 
deportation was clear.  The FBI was clearly sending a message to the 
community of Pakistanis.  If you suspect something, speak up.  
Otherwise, your own visa privileges may later be at risk. Yet while it 
was clear that the authorities were sending a message, the FBI refused 
to confirm reporters’ suspicions. But why the subterfuge?227  If as a de 
facto (if not de jure) matter, certain aliens are subject to visa-
                                                           
225 Id. 
226  Shelly Murphy, Pakistani Testified Before Grand Jury, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 5, 2010, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/06/05/man_arrested_
in_ny_terror_plot_testified_before_grand_jury/.  Minor violations would not as a 
matter of practice result in deportation even in what scholars have characterized as a 
hostile “crimmigration” climate.  See, e.g., Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration 
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 135 (2009).  
227  The term “subterfuge” in legal scholarship has been popularized by 
Calabresi.  Policy makers often employ “subterfuges,” that is, fictions to shield the 
tragic nature of their choices that offend deeply held values from public view. GUIDO 
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 88 (1985). 
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revocation for failing to report behavior that the authorities believe 
that they had reason to know, shouldn’t DHS be forthright about 
precisely what their reporting obligations are?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. The Dangers of Corruption in Social Networks 
 
In most visa-allocation programs, typically, the number of qualified 
applicants will exceed the number of visa slots.  Therefore, the 
potential rent-seeking problems are apparent.  In this particular 
proposal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented. How so?  
Projects that are reliant on leveraging social networks are particularly 
prone to corruption because they are necessarily reliant on friendships 
and familial relationships.228  This project suffers from the same 
deficiency that characterizes projects that are similarly reliant on 
social networks.   
 
What is the implication of this insight for this proposal? One could 
imagine that members of one tribal group may receive preferences not 
available to members of another tribal group.  The implication of this 
is that certain elites may be inclined to receive the benefit of the doubt 
with respect to potentially suspicious behavior in relation to other 
elites.  Thus, repeated travel to Yemen may be perceived as 
problematic for members of one elite group but not for members of 
another elite group.  
 
                                                           
228  As one commentator has said “there is an important cultural component to 
corruption.  Many corrupt officials do not seek to transgress social rules; rather, the 
rules of their society demand that they help family and friends before they see to the 
general public interest.  In many ways, nepotism is one of the most natural of human 
impulses.” Francis Fukuyama, Address at the Conference on Social Capital and 
Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean:  Towards a New Paradigm, 
Santiago, Chile (Sept. 24–26, 2001), in Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and 
Development:  The Coming Agenda, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:  TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM 45 (Raúl 
Atria et al., compilers (2004)). 
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c. McCarthyite Tendencies: Undermining Social Trust 
 
There is also the question of whether the spirit (if not the letter) of the 
First Amendment is being breached.229 Decisions during the Cold War 
era to exclude aliens for their associations with suspected American 
communists (and implicitly for their unwillingness to “snitch” on these 
communists) have withstood judicial scrutiny; it seems clear that we 
may set aside constitutional concerns.230 However, even if we are able 
to get around the constitutional questions, aspects of the proposal 
rightly offend our deepest moral intuitions.   
 
Indeed, the reliance on a culture of snitching that is reminiscent of the 
McCarthy era, in and of itself raises serious concerns. For example, 
detailed ethnographic studies of the impact of an informant culture in 
East Germany illuminate the dangers of an over-reliance on snitches to 
the social fabric of the broader society.231  
 
With husbands snitching on wives and neighbors snitching on 
neighbors, a widespread atmosphere of distrust developed in 
the broader society.  Indeed, one author described the “indirect 
harm” of a widespread societal “malaise” or societal 
                                                           
229  Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it clear that any First Amendment 
challenges to immigration restrictions are likely to fail, even when the First 
Amendment interests of American citizens are at stake. This jurisprudence is 
summarized in Kleindienst   v. Mandel.  Although American citizens have the right 
to associate with and receive information and ideas from aliens whom the 
government desires to exclude, this right will generally not outweigh "Congress' 
'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who 
possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.'"   Kleindienst   v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also American Academy of Religion v. 
Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 2009); Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 
1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008), Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682 (6th 
Cir. 2002), Price v. U.S. I.N.S., 926 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir.1991). 
230  Notably the duty will apply only to foreign nationals on foreign soil who 
would typically have difficulty pressing First Amendment claims.  Indeed as the 
cases in the previous footnote illustrate, even American citizens who seek to 
associate with or benefit from the ideas of such excluded foreign nationals have had 
difficulty pressing First Amendment claims. 
231  The most comprehensive work in this regard is Barbara Miller's. BARBARA 
MILLER, NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE IN UNIFIED GERMANY: STASI 
INFORMERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY  (1999). 
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“schizophrenia.” 232  In the words of one East German 
intellectual, “[t]hese informers determined my life . . . [i]n one 
way or another-because they poisoned us with mistrust."233  
 
A similar culture of suspicion is said to pervade the Palestinian 
territories, partly because of the widespread suspicion that Israel is 
highly reliant on Palestinian informants.234  Palestinians who are 
perceived to be beneficiaries of elite privileges (such as access to 
travel permits) are often the targets of suspicion.235  Similar stories 
also emerge from Northern Ireland, again because of the perceived 
reliance of the authorities on informants.236  
 
Of course, the diffuse utilization of snitches in diverse elite networks 
on different continents is not equivalent to the concentrated efforts of 
the East German secret police.  Yet, one need not go so far to 
recognize the dangers to the communities from which the snitches 
originate.  The effect that the McCarthy era had in cultivating a culture 
of suspicion in targeted communities (such as the artistic and academic 
communities) provides plentiful examples.237  Thus, if visa 
revocations are too widely utilized, those who retain their visas will 
necessarily become the targets of suspicion in their communities (not 
unlike the aforementioned Palestinians).  
                                                           
 
Moreover, the dangers of reliance on informant institutions are 
exacerbated because we often cannot know the motives of the persons 
who are snitching.  In addition to the previously-discussed corruption 
problem, there are also dangers of elite capture.238  Given the highly 
232  Id. at 133. 
233  Id. at 101 (quoting an East German intellectual). 
234  Lee Hockstader, Palestinians Battle the Enemy Within: Menace of Israeli 
Collaborators Spawns Executions, Vigilantism, Revenge Killings, WASH. POST, Feb. 
2, 2001, at A1. 
235  Id. 
236  Editorial, Haunted By an Informer, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 2003.  
237  A comprehensive text documenting the effect of the McCarthy era on 
cultural communities, particularly Hollywood is VICTOR NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES 
(1980).  The playwright, Arthur Miler recognized this risk decades ago. On risks of 
snitching, see John Lahr's review of Arthur Miller's seminal play, A View from the 
Bridge, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 2010. 
238  A good summary of the challenges of elite capture is included in P. 
Bardhan and D. Mookherjee, Capture and Governance at Local and National 
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competitive nature of some elite networks, consider the following 
example. One could imagine that an elite entrepreneur might share 
inaccurate information about a competitor in a deliberate effort to 
discredit her and even have her removed from the U.S.  
 
Although generally we hope that the persons who come forward to 
share information will be “good” types who have sincere concerns 
regarding a peer who may be a terrorist threat, there may be either 
“bad” types or “mixed” types who proffer information.  These would 
include individuals who purposely utilize this process to tarnish the 
reputation of someone who is not a terrorist threat.  They could also 
use the process to curry favor with the authorities for their own 
purposes, including motivating the authorities to forgive their own 
criminal behavior.239  
 
However, these concerns can be mitigated if it is made clear that 
information will not be taken at face value, but rather will be subject to 
rigorous verification. The best deterrent to such behavior is to make 
clear that individuals may compromise their visa privileges if it later 
turns out that they knowingly shared false information for nefarious 
motives.  The goal is to provide incentives for persons to share 
information that they reasonably believe to be troubling, while 
providing disincentives for them to share information that they have 
good reason to believe is false.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In contexts beyond Nigeria, the U.S. may strategically deploy both the 
revocation of privilege and this cultural valuation of family honor as a 
mechanism for motivating persons to share important information.  By 
                                                                                                                                            
Levels,  THE AM. EEC. REV., 90 (2): 135–39 (2000) and J.P. Platteau, Monitoring 
Elite Capture in Community-driven Development,  
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, 35 (2): 223–46 (2004).   
239  “Mixed” types include individuals who may not harbor ill will towards 
other elites who have visas.  Nevertheless, they share information for motives other 
than a general affirmative duty to prevent harm, without taking reasonable efforts to 
verify such information even if they have reason to believe that such information 
may not be accurate. 
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articulating a duty to snitch, which reinforces communal norms, the 
U.S. can nudge the Umarmutallabs of the world in the right direction. 
Importantly, the “nudge” should be sufficiently soft so as to be 
constructive.  Moreover, if communal norms are already working in 
the U.S.’s favor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa-revocation may 
be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.  
  
 
